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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE:  
THE EXPLOSION OF STATE LEGISLATION AND 
THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY 
DEBORAH A. WIDISS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 In recent years, domestic violence legislation has migrated out of 
its traditional locus in family law and criminal law to include a rap-
idly growing body of employment law. The new laws respond to a 
relatively simple problem: Economic security is one of the most impor-
tant factors in whether a victim of domestic violence will be able to 
separate from an abusive partner, but domestic violence often inter-
feres with victims’ ability to maintain jobs, thus causing job loss that 
further traps victims in abusive relationships. By providing support 
to victims and empowering employers to take direct legal action 
against perpetrators of actual or threatened workplace violence, the 
new legislation helps employers and employees work together to ad-
dress a shared interest in reducing the effects of domestic violence on 
the workplace. Thus, addressing domestic violence as an “employ-
ment” issue bolsters other strategies for combating domestic violence. 
Equally important, because the vast majority of victims of domestic 
violence are women, the new legislation complements traditional em-
ployment laws, such as Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, that seek to promote sex equality by addressing a significant, 
though little recognized, barrier to women’s full participation in 
the workplace.  
 This Article situates the burgeoning body of new state legislation 
within developments in domestic violence law and employment law, 
particularly those relating to accommodation of individual needs 
within the workplace. It shows that domestic violence legislation mod-
eled on employment law accommodation mandates, such as the Fam-
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Visiting Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., 
Yale College. I am grateful to Naomi Cahn, Liz Emens, Craig Green, Julie Goldscheid, 
Minna Kotkin, Tony Kronman, Robin Runge, Liz Schneider, Kate Stith, Nelson Tebbe, 
Merle Weiner, Noah Zatz, and participants in the Brooklyn Law School Junior Faculty Col-
loquium for their thoughtful comments and encouragement on earlier drafts. I also thank 
the Florida State University Law Review staff for their careful editing. This project was 
supported by the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research Stipend Program, with 
particular thanks to Dean Joan Wexler. Before beginning to teach, I spent four years as an 
attorney at Legal Momentum (the new name of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), 
where I spearheaded a national project focusing on employment and housing rights of do-
mestic violence victims. In this capacity, I represented individual victims who had been 
fired because of the violence against them; worked closely with employers interested in de-
veloping domestic violence policies; and drafted legislation introduced at federal and state 
levels. This Article grows out of my experience working directly with victims, employers, 
and legislators to address effectively the workplace effects of domestic violence. 
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ily and Medical Leave Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, im-
ports provisions in those laws that excuse relatively small or resource-
poor employers. By contrast, new laws borrowing from criminal jus-
tice, public health, or unemployment insurance models either impose 
costs on all employers or spread costs among employers. As such, the 
emerging legislation offers an interesting counterpoint to debates over 
whether and when it is appropriate to require employers to make 
workplace modifications or permit employee absences. It shows that 
reframing the interest at stake as furthering larger public interests 
seems to dramatically increase legislatures’ willingness to require 
employers to make such accommodations. Building on this finding, 
the Article further demonstrates that approaching the issue more 
comprehensively could increase the efficacy of new legislation and it 
offers several specific recommendations for future reform.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Domestic violence is, as its name suggests, intimately associated 
with the home. But, perhaps counterintuitively, it often has consid-
erable effects on the workplace and, over the past decade, there has 
been an extremely rapid growth in laws that can be characterized, 
broadly speaking, as domestic violence employment laws. Maine first 
passed legislation amending its unemployment code to address do-
mestic violence in 1996; now, in little more than a decade, more than 
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two thirds of states have passed laws that explicitly respond to the 
workplace effects of domestic violence.1  
 A true example of the “laboratory of the states,”2 the new laws are 
quite varied and cut across traditional doctrinal boundaries. They in-
clude laws that prohibit employment discrimination against victims 
of domestic violence, provide job-protected leave to permit victims to 
take steps to address the violence, and make unemployment insur-
ance benefits available to victims who must leave jobs because of the 
violence. They also include legislative and executive directives to de-
velop model policies and promote best practices for employers in re-
sponding to domestic violence as well as laws that empower employ-
ers to seek their own civil injunctive relief against perpetrators of 
workplace violence. In addition to the rapid growth in state legisla-
tion, Congress has recently authorized funding for a clearinghouse to 
collect and disseminate effective business strategies.3 Congress has 
also held hearings on the issue and considered several bills that 
would provide substantive protections analogous to those being 
adopted by various states.4  
                                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part IV (evaluating the substantive contours of the new laws).  
 2. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 3. See Violence Against Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 701 (2005) (authorizing appropriations to create resource 
center); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Public L. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 
1907 (2007). 
 4. See Survivors’ Empowerment and Economic Security Act (SEES Act), S. 1136, 
110th Cong. (2007); Security and Financial Empowerment Act (SAFE Act), H.R. 2395, 
110th Cong. (2007) (each a bill that would provide victims of domestic violence job-
protected leave for a variety of domestic violence-related needs, access to unemployment 
benefits, and protection from employment and insurance discrimination); Unemployment 
Insurance Modernization Act, S. 1871, 110th Cong. (2007) (bill that would provide incen-
tives to states that provide unemployment insurance benefits to victims of domestic vio-
lence); Crime Victims Employment Leave Act, H.R. 5845, 110th Cong. (2008) (bill that 
would provide job-protected leave to victims to participate in prosecution of domestic vio-
lence crimes); Too Much, Too Long? Domestic Violence in the Workplace: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Employment and Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Educational 
Labor and Pensions 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_04_17/2007_04_17.html. Notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court’s determination that a federal civil rights remedy for gender-based violence 
exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000), Congress probably has authority to pass employment-related domestic vio-
lence legislation because of such legislation’s nexus to economic activity and thus inter-
state commerce. Cf. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726-27 (2003) 
(noting without comment that Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act pursu-
ant to its power under the Commerce Clause, as well as pursuant to its power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 
U.S. 366, 395 n.20 (1979) (noting that Title VII was enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause); Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978) (opinion of four justices concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting the same). 
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 Surprisingly, this explosion in new laws has been almost invisible 
in academic commentary addressing domestic violence, as well as 
that addressing developments in employment law affecting issues of 
work and family or women’s participation in the workplace.5 This Ar-
ticle is the first comprehensive evaluation of the dramatic new land-
scape of legislation focusing on the workplace effects of domestic vio-
lence. It shows that the migration of domestic violence legislation be-
yond its traditional locus in criminal law and family law into em-
ployment law signals an important new approach, and potentially 
very effective strategy, to combat domestic violence. 
 The converse is equally true: Domestic violence legislation can be 
an important part of promoting equality for women at work. One in 
four women is a victim of domestic violence at some point in her life,6 
and studies find that up to half of victims lose a job because of the 
violence.7 Domestic violence is a significant—but rarely noted—
barrier to women’s employment. Thus, efforts to address domestic 
violence (including workplace interventions and more traditional 
family law, criminal law, or nonlegal support strategies) should be 
recognized as a complement to employment laws such as Title VII 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that seek to promote 
women’s full participation in the workplace.  
 The body of law that is the focus of this Article addresses a rela-
tively straightforward problem. Economic security is one of the most 
important factors in whether a victim of domestic violence can sepa-
rate from an abusive partner. In other words, ensuring that a victim 
of domestic violence can maintain a steady job can be a primary 
strategy in addressing domestic violence, as important for many vic-
tims as the availability of a bed in a shelter, prosecution of a bat-
terer, or access to civil legal services. Perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence, however, often interfere with victims’ employment by harass-
ing victims at work or causing them to miss work; victims may also 
                                                                                                                     
 5. To the extent commentators have addressed the workplace effects of domestic vio-
lence, most have focused on employer liability under standard tort law or general sex dis-
crimination laws. See infra sources cited in note 39 and note 43. There are a few articles 
that discuss in greater detail the state legislative developments that are the focus of this 
Article, see infra sources cited in note 93.  
 6. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf; see also COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH 
CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN’S LIFESPAN: 1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN’S HEALTH 8 (1999) 
[hereinafter COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CONCERNS], available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Healthconcerns__surveyreport.pdf?section=4039 (finding nearly one-
third of women reported being subjected to domestic violence by a spouse or boyfriend). 
 7. HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 
19 (1998) [hereinafter HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS.], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf.   
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need to be absent to go to court, get medical treatment, or move to a 
safe location. More dramatically, albeit relatively rarely, perpetrators 
attack victims or their coworkers at work. Often, employers respond 
to domestic violence by firing the victim; alternatively, victims, not 
realizing that they could ask for support at work, feel forced to quit. 
Job loss itself then becomes a contributing factor that helps trap a 
victim in a violent relationship.  
 The legislation discussed in this Article seeks to change the status 
quo by providing a baseline of protections to victims to help them 
keep their jobs while taking steps to address the violence, encourag-
ing employers to help victims access resources, and empowering em-
ployers to take legal action directly against perpetrators of actual or 
threatened violence, rather than resort to firing the victim. Because 
this burgeoning body of law has been so little discussed, a primary 
objective of the Article is to evaluate the substantive contours of 
emerging legislation. I identify two common challenges faced by leg-
islatures seeking to address the issue. First, lawmakers must deter-
mine how to address the perpetrator’s role, particularly because tra-
ditional models of employment law focus on the relationship between 
the employer and the victim/employee. Second, and relatedly, law-
makers must determine who should bear costs for absences or work-
place modifications that are due to the perpetrator’s actions. Various 
statutes resolve these questions in widely divergent fashions. 
 In fact, because states have taken so many different approaches to 
the issue, the domestic violence employment legislation discussed in 
this Article offers a natural “case study” in which to test the political 
saliency and practical effects of different frames for employment leg-
islation. Laws providing time off to victims of domestic violence to 
take steps to address the violence, which I call “domestic violence 
leave laws,” provide the starkest example of this phenomenon. 
Eleven states have adopted such legislation, using two different 
“models”: the federal FMLA, which only applies to employers with at 
least fifty employees, and state statutes that protect crime victims 
from being fired for missing work to participate in the prosecution of 
the crime, which generally apply to all employers. The coverage of 
domestic violence leave laws tends to follow the model used. Those 
that are modeled on the FMLA only apply to large employers. This is 
true even for laws that authorize just three days leave (compared to 
the twelve weeks permitted under the FMLA), suggesting that 
smaller businesses could easily accommodate such absences. The 
domestic violence leave laws modeled on the crime victim laws, by 
contrast, typically apply to all employers, no matter how small. In 
other words, although the substantive intent of the laws is identi-
cal—to permit victims to take time off to address domestic violence 
without losing their jobs—state legislatures’ willingness to impose 
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costs associated with absences on small employers seems to vary 
dramatically according to the model used.  
 Thus the emerging domestic violence employment legislation of-
fers an interesting counterpoint to an ongoing conversation among 
employment discrimination theorists regarding the extent to which 
the primary federal “accommodation” mandates, the FMLA and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), differ from Title VII’s anti-
discrimination provisions and, more generally, when and how costs 
associated with accommodations for individual needs may legiti-
mately be imposed upon employers.8 Domestic violence laws that are 
modeled on the FMLA and the ADA, typically, like those laws, bal-
ance cost of workplace modification against the resources of the indi-
vidual employer and excuse employers deemed too small or resource-
poor. But other new domestic violence employment laws, drawing on 
criminal law, workplace safety, or public health paradigms, impose 
costs associated with such accommodations on all employers or con-
sciously spread costs across employers. While it is difficult to know 
exactly why the legislation is developing in this manner, I suggest 
that it may be because domestic violence advocates have successfully 
reframed what once was considered a “private” matter beyond the 
reach of the law as a public crisis demanding a systemic response. 
When employment protections are framed in terms of these larger 
public interests, rather than as “individual” benefits under tradi-
tional employment law models, legislatures seem to be more comfort-
able asking all employers to play a role. The new laws thus offer the 
possibility to reconsider more generally how employment legislation 
can address “family” issues and the putative distinction between the 
“private” sphere of the family and the “public” sphere of work. 
 The Article further argues that future legislative reform should 
consciously build on this recognition of larger “public” interests at 
stake. Although some new laws are primarily concerned with victims’ 
interests and some with employers’ interests, inadequate attention 
has been paid to the extent to which the various legislative strategies 
are interlocking. For example, giving employers the power to seek in-
junctive relief against the perpetrator of violence will be much more 
effective at reducing workplace incidents if victims also have a guar-
antee that they will not be fired for disclosing domestic violence to 
their employers. A comprehensive package of reforms, which strate-
gically pairs protections, is both more likely to pass and more likely 
to be effective if passed because it is better able to appropriately bal-
ance employee and employer interests. Thus, a comprehensive strat-
egy yields benefits that are greater than the sum of the parts. Addi-
tionally, and building on the insights of theorists advocating “struc-
                                                                                                                     
 8. See infra text accompanying note 89.  
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tural” reforms in response to what is often termed “second-
generation” employment discrimination, I advocate developing new 
legislative language that can foster collaborative problem solving be-
tween employers and employees. Finally, I argue that we need sys-
tematically to evaluate the effectiveness of various strategies and 
consider use of public money to subsidize workplace modifications 
that go beyond what employers can reasonably bear. 
 The Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes results from a 
growing body of social science research documenting the significant 
impact of domestic violence on the workplace. It identifies specific 
benefits that may be served by addressing domestic violence through 
workplace legislation and offers suggestions as to why a purely mar-
ket-based approach is unlikely to be adequate in responding to the 
problem. Part III places domestic violence workplace legislation in 
context by briefly discussing recent developments in other areas of 
domestic violence legislation and in employment law addressing ac-
commodation of individual employees’ needs and women’s roles as 
workers. Part IV evaluates the new domestic violence legislation. 
Part V argues that future legislative strategies should more carefully 
consider the interlocking objectives of employers, employees, and the 
public.  
II.   DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE WORKPLACE 
A.   The Scope of the Problem 
 A growing body of social science research documents that it is ex-
tremely common for perpetrators of domestic violence to purposefully 
interfere with victims’ ability to work by harassing them at work, 
limiting their access to cash or transportation, or sabotaging their 
childcare arrangements.9 Such economic abuse is part of a larger pat-
tern of coercion; it also specifically responds to the self-evident truth 
that a person who is employed is more likely to be able to escape con-
                                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7 (finding between 35 and 
56 percent of employed battered women surveyed were harassed at work by their abusive 
partners); CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT & JENNIFER STAPLETON, WASH. STATE UNIV. & 
SPOKANE COUNTY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSORTIUM, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: IT’S A 
WORKPLACE ISSUE! 20 (2005) (finding 51 percent of employed female intimate partner vio-
lence victims and 35 percent of employed male victims report some level of work disrup-
tion); JODY RAPHAEL & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, TRAPPED IN POVERTY, TRAPPED BY ABUSE: 
NEW EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
WELFARE (1997) (discussing typical forms of harassment); Jennifer E. Swanberg & T.K. 
Logan, Domestic Violence and Employment: A Qualitative Study, 10 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH PSYCH. 3 (2005) (citing Jacquelynn Lynn, Close to Home, ENTREPRENEUR, Oct. 
1998, at 92 (finding 70 percent of employed victims say their abusers have harassed them 
at work)); Judith McFarlane et al., Indicators of Intimate Partner Violence in Women’s 
Employment, 48 AM. ASSOC. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSES J. 217 (May 2000) (finding 51 
percent of victims reported being bothered at work by the abuser in person and 63 percent 
reported being bothered at work by the abuser over the telephone).  
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trol and achieve independence from her abuser.10 The effects of such 
abuse are considerable because domestic violence itself is so preva-
lent. The Department of Justice, for example, has found that, on av-
erage, 960,000 Americans are physically abused by a current or for-
mer spouse or boyfriend or girlfriend each year.11 Although both men 
and women can be perpetrators of domestic violence and domestic 
violence occurs in same-sex relationships, the overwhelming majority 
of perpetrators of domestic violence are men and the overwhelming 
majority of victims are women.12 And domestic violence is wide-
spread: One in four women reports being physically assaulted, raped, 
or stalked by an intimate partner at some point during her life.13 
 Batterers can be extremely creative and dogged in their efforts to 
disrupt victims’ employment. My former clients’ stories are illustra-
tive. For example, one of my clients, a social worker, was fired after 
her ex-husband called her employer and a city agency that had a 
large contract with her employer and falsely accused her of using 
drugs. Although she offered to take—and then passed—a drug test, 
her employer fired her because the employer believed the allegations 
could jeopardize their funding and because her ex-husband repeat-
edly called the workplace. (Significantly, this occurred after my client 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Domestic violence is typically described as a pattern of coercive control that in-
cludes emotional abuse, financial abuse, sexual abuse, and threats in addition to physical 
violence. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, POWER AND CONTROL 
WHEEL, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/PowerControlwheelNOSHADING.pdf.  
 11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: 
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND 
GIRLFRIENDS (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf 
(finding 85 percent of victims are female and 15 percent of victims are male). Accordingly, 
in this Article I typically refer to victims as female and perpetrators as male. All of the spe-
cific domestic violence statutes discussed, however, are gender neutral and protect both 
male and female victims. Additionally, following common parlance, I refer to individuals 
who are experiencing domestic violence as “victims” and individuals who in the past have 
experienced such violence as “survivors.” I note, however, that even while subject to ongo-
ing violence, many victims show considerable fortitude in taking steps to protect them-
selves and provide for their families and are, in that sense, already “survivors.” See gener-
ally, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 39-40, 66-68 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing extent to which battered women are 
also survivors). 
 13. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 6, at 9; COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH 
CONCERNS, supra note 6, at 8. This Article focuses on the effects of domestic violence on 
the workplace and the emerging body of law that seeks to mitigate these effects. There is a 
growing recognition that sexual assault and stalking may have similar effects—indeed, of-
ten perpetrators of domestic violence also sexually assault and/or stalk their victims—and 
increasingly, legislation in this area refers to all three crimes. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. §§ 180/10(5), 180/20, 180/30 (2006) (providing employment leave and prohibiting dis-
crimination against victims of “[d]omestic or sexual violence,” defined as including “domes-
tic violence, sexual assault, or stalking”). In general, the arguments I make here regarding 
domestic violence legislation would equally apply to (at least nonstranger) sexual assault 
and stalking. 
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had left her husband; he began harassing her at work when he no 
longer knew where she lived.) Another client, who worked as a maid 
at a hotel, refused to take calls from her ex-boyfriend; she was fired 
because he then began calling the front desk of the hotel several 
dozen times an hour. 
 Domestic violence also frequently causes absences from work. Vic-
tims often need to miss work to go to court, meet with the police, ob-
tain medical treatment, relocate to a new home, or secure an existing 
home. These absences may be necessary because certain services are 
only open during regular business hours.14 Additionally, because 
abusers typically keep very close control over their partners and 
would notice any unexplained delay in returning from work, for some 
victims, it is only during hours that they are expected to be at work 
that they can safely begin to take steps to plan for a separation. Do-
mestic violence frequently causes mental health conditions, including 
post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety disorders, 
that also may cause victims to miss work. Likewise, victims fre-
quently miss work due to incapacitating physical injuries or visible 
bruising, such as a black eye, which make them ashamed to go out 
in public.15  
 Studies estimate that victims of intimate partner violence in the 
United States lose eight million days of paid work each year, the 
equivalent of over 32,000 full-time jobs.16 On average, the experience 
of domestic violence reduces a woman’s annual work hours by 137 
hours, almost four full-time weeks.17 Additionally, it is common for 
victims to lose their jobs due to absences, workplace disruptions, per-
formance problems—or simple prejudice against victims. According 
to a 1998 report of the U.S. General Accounting Office, between 24 
and 52 percent of domestic violence victims in three studies reported 
that they lost a job due, at least in part, to domestic violence.18 Given 
its prevalence, domestic violence is a significant barrier to women’s 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Of course, emergency medical treatment is available twenty-four hours a day. 
Likewise, most jurisdictions have the ability to handle an initial request for a temporary 
restraining order outside of standard business hours. Follow-up appointments for medical 
treatment or subsequent court proceedings, however, are usually scheduled during stan-
dard business hours.  
 15. See, e.g., McFarlane et al., supra note 9 (finding 58 percent of victims reported 
missing work because of the abuse and that 47 percent were specifically prevented from 
working by the abuser). Typical means of preventing work included leaving the victim 
without transportation, keeping her trapped at home, causing injuries that prevented her 
from working, and simply ordering her not to work. See id.  
 16. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf. 
 17. Richard Tolman & Hui-Chen Wang, Domestic Violence and Women’s Employment: 
Fixed Effects Models of Three Waves of Women’s Employment Study Data, 36 AM. J. COMM. 
PSYCH. 147, 153 (2005). 
 18. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19.  
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employment. Some experts believe that “more women leave the work-
force permanently because of domestic violence than leave to raise 
children.”19 
 The loss of employment can be particularly devastating for victims 
of domestic violence. As the Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence puts it: 
Economic insecurity is one of the biggest obstacles to safety for 
domestic violence victims and their families. The inability to sur-
vive financially without the abuser—due to loss of income, a place 
to live, childcare, and other money and resources—is the reason 
that survivors most often give for why they have to return to their 
abusers.20 
Victims who lack independent income and do not return to abusers 
often end up homeless. In the U.S. Conference of Mayors annual sur-
vey of mayors of large cities, many identify domestic violence as one 
of the primary causes of homelessness in their cities.21 A survey of 
homeless parents confirmed this reality; 57 percent of those who had 
lived with a spouse or partner left their last home because of domes-
tic violence.22 To save victims from the unconscionable choice of re-
turning to an abusive partner or becoming homeless, domestic vio-
lence service providers increasingly see helping victims obtain eco-
nomic security as an essential part of their mandate.23  
 In addition to the obvious toll that domestic violence places on vic-
tims and their families, it also places significant costs on busi-
                                                                                                                     
 19. DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 9 (3d ed. 2000). 
 20. Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, What We Do: Economic Justice Pro-
ject, http://www.gcadv.org/html/what/economic_justice.html (last visited June 23, 2008); 
see also Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Economic Justice Project, 
http://www.wscadv.org/projects/EJP/index.htm (last visited June 23, 2008) (“Lack of in-
come is one of the most commonly given reasons that battered women stay with or return 
to an abusive partner.”). Increasingly commentators are also focusing on the significance of 
economic independence for victims. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered 
Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 
(2000) (arguing that priority in domestic violence reform should be given policies or laws 
that improve women’s access to material resources).   
 21. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS 
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES, A 24-CITY SURVEY, 
DECEMBER 2005, at 64 (2005),  available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/hungersurvey/ 
2005/HH2005FINAL.pdf (half of the cities surveyed in 2005 identified domestic violence as 
a primary cause of homelessness). 
 22. HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS & INST. FOR CHILDREN & POVERTY, TEN CITIES: A 
SNAPSHOT OF FAMILY HOMELESSNESS ACROSS AMERICA, 1997-1998, at 13 (1998), available 
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/fb/5d.pdf. 
 23. Strategies include providing job training or financial literacy education, small 
grants to facilitate work, and advocacy to improve the way in which the welfare system 
handles victims of domestic violence, as well as advocacy for employment protections such 
as those discussed in this Article.  
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nesses.24 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) re-
cently found that domestic violence can be estimated to cost employ-
ers $5.8 billion in productivity losses and health care costs.25 Other 
reports have found the costs to employers to be as high as $31 billion 
annually.26 (Significantly, while most studies focus on the cost borne 
by employers of victims of domestic violence, a few studies have also 
demonstrated that perpetrators of domestic violence place significant 
costs on their own employers through tardiness and absences and 
use of work equipment to stalk or harass their partners.27) Perhaps 
most dramatically, domestic violence also sometimes spills over into 
incidents of workplace violence.28  
 The business world is beginning to recognize the impacts of do-
mestic violence. In a survey, 66 percent of senior executives and 75 
percent of human resources directors indicated that they believed 
addressing domestic violence in the workplace would decrease its 
                                                                                                                     
 24. In considering such figures, it is important to remember that the ultimate cause of 
the costs associated with domestic violence is not the victim—it is the perpetrator. As will 
be discussed further infra, one of the challenges faced by the new legislation is whether the 
employer may be reasonably asked to bear these costs; other options include placing the 
costs on the victim (that is, permitting employers to fire a victim rather than incur such 
costs) or spreading them more generally across employers or the general tax base. I am as-
suming, for purposes of this discussion, that one party can be determined to be the perpe-
trator. Although it is not uncommon for both members of an abusive relationship to com-
mit physical violence, typically one party can be determined to be the primary aggressor.  
 25. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 16, at 2; see also 
Carol Reeves & Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, The Effects and Costs of Intimate Partner Violence 
for Work Organizations, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 327, 328 (2007) (noting that the 
CDC figures probably understate the total costs because they fail to include costs associ-
ated with turnover).  
 26. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 383, 385 (1994). 
 27. See ELLEN RIDLEY, ME. DEP’T OF LABOR & FAMILY CRISIS SERVS., IMPACT OF 
DOMESTIC OFFENDERS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: A PILOT STUDY (2004) (re-
porting survey of batterers, in which 78 percent reported using their own company’s re-
sources in connection with the abuse or 42 percent reported being late to work because of 
their abuse of their partners).  
 28. It is actually relatively uncommon for domestic violence to cause violence at the 
workplace. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, it is a recognized risk 
factor for workplace violence, and occupational health researchers categorize workplace 
violence stemming from domestic violence as one of four primary “types” of workplace vio-
lence (along with violence that results from criminal actions, such as robberies, directed 
toward the business; violence from customers or clients at a workplace; and violence from 
disgruntled employees or former employees). See NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION 
STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH NEEDS, 4-5 (2006). Experts on workplace safety increasingly 
discuss the need to address domestic violence as part of a more general strategy to reduce 
the risk of violence at workplaces. See, e.g., MARK BRAVERMAN, PREVENTING WORKPLACE 
VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS AND PRACTITIONERS 84-90 (1999); MICHELE A. PALUDI 
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES 
73-86 (2006); Bonnie S. Fisher & Corinne Peek-Asa, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: 
Do We Know Too Much of Nothing?, in WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES, TRENDS, 
STRATEGIES 97-120 (Vaughan Bowie et al. eds., 2005). 
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negative effects.29 Even more strikingly, 94 percent of corporate secu-
rity and safety directors at companies nationwide ranked domestic 
violence as a high security concern.30 Although human resources and 
security personnel are among those most likely to be asked to handle 
domestic violence situations as part of their jobs, domestic violence’s 
effects on the workplace are felt far more broadly. In fact, 44 percent 
of all employed adults reported having personally experienced the ef-
fects of domestic violence (either against themselves or a coworker) 
in their workplaces.31 Employees identify domestic violence as impor-
tant a workplace issue as terrorism, job insecurity, and em-
ployee theft.32  
B.   Benefits of Addressing Domestic Violence as a Workplace Issue 
 The data detailed above suggests three general benefits that can 
be realized by addressing domestic violence as a workplace issue.  
 First, economic independence is an essential factor in permitting 
victims of domestic violence to end abusive relationships. Job loss 
undermines efforts to secure the safety of victims by increasing the 
likelihood that they will return to abusers or else (especially given 
the limits of other forms of public assistance) lack resources to pro-
vide for themselves and their families. Thus, maintaining employ-
ment (or, in the absence of employment, receiving access to some 
other independent source of income) can be understood as a primary 
tool in addressing domestic violence. Additionally, legislation or 
other strategies to combat job loss of victims does not just manage 
collateral effects of domestic violence. Rather, it offers the possibility 
of serving as a primary strategy in reducing the occurrence or con-
tinuation of the violence and fits well with a growing emphasis in 
domestic violence policy towards focusing on material resources 
available to victims.33 Equally important, because the vast majority 
of victims of domestic violence are women, effectively managing do-
mestic violence can play a central role in facilitating women’s full 
participation in the workplace.  
 Second, batterers often purposefully isolate their victims from 
friends and family as part of a larger pattern of abuse. The work-
                                                                                                                     
 29. PARTNERSHIP FOR PREVENTION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE STUDY 
3 (2002).  
 30. Joseph A. Kinney, Domestic Violence Moves into Workplace, WORKPLACE 
VIOLENCE & BEHAV. LETTER (Nat’l Safe Workplace Inst., Charlotte, N.C.) Nov. 1994, at 3. 
 31. CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE, NATIONAL BENCHMARK 
TELEPHONE SURVEY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/CAEPVSurvey.WorkPlace.pdf. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Cf. Coker, supra note 20 (arguing that priority in domestic violence reform should 
be given to policies or laws that improve women’s access to material resources). 
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place can be an effective means of reaching victims of domestic vio-
lence because it is a place where a batterer has considerably less con-
trol. The support of coworkers and supervisors can be extremely im-
portant for victims struggling to end an abusive relationship. Indeed, 
sociologists have increasingly observed that, for all workers, the 
workplace is gradually replacing other spaces as a principal site for 
employees’ social lives and a primary source of community.34 This is 
particularly true for victims of domestic violence. Thus, workplaces 
can be an ideal forum for helping victims know about domestic vio-
lence services that may be available in their communities. Providing 
information for referrals to personnel in human resources depart-
ments and Employee Assistance Plans, or simply hanging a poster on 
a bulletin board or in a bathroom, can be an ideal way to help a vic-
tim realize that support is available.35 In this respect, raising aware-
ness of domestic violence in the workplace increases the likelihood 
that victims will access other domestic violence support services. 
 Third, as is evident from the studies on the economic effects of 
domestic violence, both victims and their employers bear significant 
costs associated with domestic violence. Although employers may 
“blame” victims for these costs, it may be more accurate to recharac-
terize both individual victims and their employers as “victims” of the 
perpetrator. Effectively addressing domestic violence can reduce the 
costs that both bear. Moreover, because employers do have an eco-
nomic interest in the issue, as well as a concern for the wellbeing of 
their employees, they can become a powerful force in effectively ad-
dressing domestic violence. The challenge is to address employers’ 
legitimate interest in decreasing productivity losses and the threat of 
workplace violence associated with domestic violence using means 
other than firing the victim. Additionally, since neither the employer 
nor the employee is the true cause of the costs, the question of who 
should bear them, or whether they can be spread more generally, be-
comes an important one in legislative responses. 
C.   Limitations of a Purely Market-Based Approach 
 Suggesting, as I do above, that businesses are bearing costs asso-
ciated with domestic violence and that they are well positioned to 
support their employees in addressing domestic violence raises the 
                                                                                                                     
 34. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND 
HOME BECOMES WORK 40 (1997) (“The social life that once might have surrounded her at 
home she now found at work. The sense of being part of a lively, larger, ongoing commu-
nity—that, too, was at work.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Ellen Simon, Employers Step Up Domestic Violence Help, 
ABCNEWS.COM, Aug. 28, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=3533367 (col-
lecting stories of companies that have assisted individual victims and helped them access 
resources).  
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obvious question of why legal regulation is necessary at all. Won’t the 
private marketplace just take care of the problem?  
 The short answer is simply that, as an empirical matter, it does 
not. A study conducted in 2005 by the Bureau of Labor Services 
found that roughly 15 percent of businesses have a workplace vio-
lence policy that addresses domestic violence and only 4 percent of 
businesses provide training on such policies.36 It is not common for 
companies to explicitly offer support to employees who are victims of 
domestic violence.37 Significantly, businesses often focus on domestic 
violence only after experiencing significant workplace violence re-
lated to domestic violence.38  
 Nonetheless, as discussed at the end of this Section, increasingly 
businesses are tackling the problem. While such voluntary actions 
are clearly desirable and (as discussed in Part V) should help inform 
legislative responses, there are several reasons why legal reform is 
nonetheless necessary. First, the status quo legal structure (absent 
the specific legislative developments discussed in Part IV) offers 
some disincentives to employers and employees effectively sharing 
knowledge and working together to address domestic violence. Sec-
ond, studies suggest that managers in businesses underestimate the 
likelihood that they are employing victims of domestic violence and 
overestimate the likelihood that employing victims will lead to vio-
lence in the workplace. These misperceptions, combined with soci-
ety’s ongoing discomfort with domestic violence generally, distort any 
cost-benefit analysis on which a purely-market based solution would 
rest. Third, there are reforms that legislatures may feel are appro-
priate as part of the public’s commitment to ending domestic violence 
                                                                                                                     
 36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SURVEY OF WORKPLACE 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, 2005 tbls. 10 & 11 (2006) [hereinafter BLS REPORT],  available at 
http://stats.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osnr0026.pdf (showing that 29.1 percent of businesses have 
policies addressing workplace violence generally and that, of those, a little under half (44.7 
percent) address domestic violence as a cause of workplace violence); id. at tbl. 12 (showing 
4 percent of businesses conduct training on domestic violence). 
 37. It is relatively common for businesses (especially large businesses) to offer general 
counseling or assistance through an Employee Assistance Program or referrals to commu-
nity programs. Employees, however, often are unaware of such supports. See Corporate 
Leaders and America’s Workforce on Domestic Violence, CEO and Employee Survey 2007 
[hereinafter CAEPV 2007 Survey] (unpublished study, on file with author) (noting that 72 
percent of CEOs indicated that their companies offered domestic violence or counseling to 
their employees but only 48 percent of employees knew about the services).  
 38. See CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET AL., RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST., INVENTORY OF 
WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS DESIGNED TO PREVENT INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE § 3.2.1, 
at 3-4 (2006) [hereinafter CDC INVENTORY], available at 
http://www.caepv.org/membercenter/files/Inventory%20of%20Workplace%20Interventions
%20Designed%20to%20Prevent%20IPV%20(May%202006).pdf (suggesting incidents of 
workplace violence were the primary factor identified by companies as leading to develop-
ing a program on domestic violence). By contrast, one company indicated it became inter-
ested in the issue because of a state initiative suggesting employers could play a role in 
addressing intimate partner violence. Id. § 3.2.1, at 3-5.  
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that go beyond what businesses—even with full understanding of the 
costs and benefits—would choose to do. I address each proposition in 
turn. 
 Under traditional tort law principles, employers may be held re-
sponsible for failing to address potential workplace violence. Gener-
ally speaking, a plaintiff needs to establish that there were warnings 
signs of the violence, that the company knew or should have known 
about these signs, and that the company could have, but failed, to 
take steps to minimize or prevent the violence. There have been sev-
eral cases arising out of violence at work related to domestic violence; 
a few have yielded several million dollar judgments or settlements to 
persons injured when employers failed to take reasonable precau-
tions.39 However, in far more cases, courts find that an employer 
cannot be held responsible for criminal acts of a third party, gener-
ally on the grounds that the violence was not foreseeable.40 This ar-
guably creates the perverse incentive for employers to try to close 
their eyes to potential (but not necessarily evident) risks, actually in-
creasing the threat to the victim and her coworkers. In fact, when 
asked what barriers they believe their company would face if it 
sought to implement an explicit domestic violence workplace policy, 
many CEOs cite concern with “legal ramifications of becoming in-
volved” as a primary obstacle.41 
 At the same time, absent specific employment protections, victims 
of domestic violence who disclose their situation to their employers 
may be fired with relative impunity. That is, the general rule of at-
will employment permits most employees to be fired at any time for 
any reason or no reason so long as they are not fired for a reason spe-
cifically prohibited (such as race, sex, national origin, etc.). Advocates 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Other commentators have reviewed this body of law and recent decisions in some 
detail. See John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s Dilemma in 
Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 309 (2004); Stephanie L. Perin, Em-
ployers May Have to Pay When Domestic Violence Goes to Work, 18 REV. LITIG. 365 (1999); 
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Do-
mestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2006); Jennifer M. Gaines, 
Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walk-
ing a Tightrope without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 139 (2000); see also 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 12, 788-97 (discussing 
potential liability for injuries from domestic violence that occurs at work under both work-
ers’ compensation and tort frameworks); Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and 
Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 
59 SMU L. REV. 55, 86-89 (2006) (discussing relatively limited employer tort liability for 
rape and sexual assault). 
 40. See, e.g., Matejkovic, supra note 39, at 313 (collecting cases). In cases where the 
abuser works for the same employer as the victim, by contrast, courts are much more likely 
to hold the company responsible, generally under a negligent hiring, negligent retention, or 
failure to warn theory. See id. 
 41. See CAEPV 2007 Survey, supra note 37, at 7; see also infra note 51 (describing 
other barriers often identified). 
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for battered women have had some luck arguing that terminating a 
victim of domestic violence because of the violence against her vio-
lates sex discrimination laws.42 But, as other commentators have also 
concluded, such claims are often hard to make out under existing 
law, either because the absence of a male comparator makes it diffi-
cult to prove a disparate treatment claim or because it may be diffi-
cult to establish that a single termination was pursuant to a “policy 
or practice” sufficient to make out a disparate impact claim.43 A few 
courts have also held that firing a victim because of violence against 
her may state a tort claim for termination in violation of public pol-
icy.44 Nonetheless, many courts would hold that it is perfectly legal 
                                                                                                                     
 42. There are a handful of cases in which victims who have been fired have won fa-
vorable decisions on sex discrimination claims (at least in pretrial motions). These have 
proceeded under a variety of theories: A showing that a policy of penalizing victims has a 
disparate impact on women, see Pooley v. Union County, No. 01-343-JE (D. Or. Mar. 17, 
2003) (unpublished decision, on file with author); Thoma v. LJ’s Bad Penny Bar and Café, 
No. CR200600641 (Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., Equal Rights Div.) (filed Feb. 21, 2006) 
(probable cause determination) (as an attorney at Legal Momentum, I was counsel on this 
case), a showing that, in a situation where both a male abuser and a female victim worked 
for the same employer, the abuser was treated more favorably, Rohde v. K.O. Steel Cast-
ings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981), and a showing that assaults or harassment related 
to the workplace constituted sexual harassment and that the employer failed to respond 
adequately, Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995). Similar theories have 
been used to claim that evictions of victims of domestic violence may violate the Fair Hous-
ing Act. See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005). The Bouley 
case also relied on a theory that adverse actions against victims of domestic violence based 
on discriminatory sex-stereotypes violated the Fair Housing Act, see id., a theory that 
could be likewise successful in the employment context. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding employment decision based in part on sex-based stereotypes 
could state a discrimination claim under Title VII).   
 43. Julie Goldscheid offers one of the most nuanced assessments of the viability of Ti-
tle VII to address employment discrimination against victims of domestic violence. See 
Julie Goldscheid, Gendered Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex Dis-
crimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140246 (arguing that many forms of 
employment discrimination against victims should be actionable, particularly if the role 
that gender-based bias plays in such actions were more clearly identified). A few other 
commentators have discussed the viability of Title VII claims in some detail. See Nina W. 
Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& SOC. JUST. 371, 393-94 (2007) (arguing that sex discrimination laws offer limited utility 
to victims of domestic violence); Maria Amelia Calaf, Comment, Breaking the Cycle: Title 
VII, Domestic Violence, and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167 (2003) (arguing 
that generally employment discrimination against victims should be actionable under Ti-
tle VII). 
 44. See, e.g., Greer v. Beck’s Pub & Grille, No. C03-2070 LRR (N.D. Iowa Jan. 4, 2006) 
(unpublished decision, on file with author) (denying defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on a wrongful discharge claim where victim was fired after having sought a pro-
tective order against an abusive coworker) (as an attorney at Legal Momentum, I was 
counsel on this case); Pooley v. Union County, No. 01-343-JE (D. Or. Mar. 17, 2003) (un-
published decision, on file with author) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment on a wrongful discharge claim where victim was subjected to harassment at work af-
ter having sought a protective order); Apessos v. Mem’l Press Group, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 322, 
324 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding that firing a victim for missing work to obtain a pro-
tective order stated a claim of termination in violation of public policy). But see, e.g., Imes 
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for an employer to fire at will a victim of domestic violence based on 
the violence against her. Thus, just as employers under general tort 
law have an incentive to avoid learning about domestic violence, em-
ployees under general employment law principles have a powerful 
incentive to avoid disclosing their situation to their employers. Exist-
ing law therefore tends to reduce the likelihood that employers and 
employees will work together effectively to address the situation. 
 Nonetheless, the growing number of businesses that are voluntar-
ily taking steps to address domestic violence makes clear that under 
existing legal standards employers more generally could be taking 
more effective steps to address domestic violence. Indeed, any in-
creased tort risk stemming from taking proactive steps is purely 
speculative. More likely, so long as an employer could show that it 
acted reasonably in light of any perceived threat, it still would not be 
deemed to be liable under a tort framework for third party violence; 
in fact, taking appropriate precautions would decrease the likelihood 
that an employer would be held responsible.   
 A recent survey of CEOs and employees at Fortune 1500 compa-
nies documents information gaps that may offer more of an explana-
tion as to why it is uncommon for businesses to adopt effective do-
mestic violence policies. The survey found that most CEOs think that 
relatively few of their employees are victims or survivors of domestic 
violence: 83 percent of CEOs think fewer than 10 percent of their 
full-time employees are victims or survivors of domestic violence.45 
Employees understand that the prevalence of domestic violence af-
fecting their coworkers is much higher.46 This misperception causes 
managers to underestimate the effects of domestic violence on their 
businesses; in other words, although the business may be suffering 
losses associated with absences, productivity decreases, or turnover 
caused by domestic violence, many managers will not identify domes-
tic violence as the root cause. Again, coworkers better understand 
that domestic violence is having a significant effect on the bottom 
                                                                                                                     
v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming grant of employer’s mo-
tion to dismiss victim’s wrongful termination claim on grounds that protected classes could 
only be created by the legislature); see also Tarr, supra note 43, at 395-402 (discussing pos-
sibilities and challenges in framing wrongful termination claims in this context); Sandra S. 
Park, Note, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public Policy” Excep-
tion to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
121 (2003) (arguing that firing victims because of violence against them should state a 
claim of termination in violation of public policy). 
 45. See CAEPV 2007 Survey, supra note 37, at 4. The survey was the third bench-
marking study tracking views of CEOs regarding domestic violence; all three were com-
missioned by Liz Claiborne, Inc., which has made raising awareness of the issue (and sup-
porting its own employees who are dealing with domestic violence) a priority.  
 46. Id. (finding 51 percent of employees think more than 10 percent of full-time work-
ers at their companies are victims or survivors; 19 percent of employees think more than 
25 percent of full-time workers are victims or survivors). 
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line at their company.47 The general discomfort and stigma that re-
main associated with domestic violence in our society further exacer-
bates this “under-counting.” Many victims feel deep shame; victim 
blaming remains common. Additionally, as noted above, under tradi-
tional employment law standards, victims may be fired with relative 
impunity. Thus, few victims will voluntarily share their situation 
with others (particularly managers) at work unless the employer has 
explicitly invited such disclosure by promulgating a policy on point. 
 At the same time as they discount the likelihood that they are 
employing victims of domestic violence, managers may overestimate 
the likelihood that employment of a (hypothetical) victim would re-
sult in workplace violence. Experts advocating that businesses adopt 
effective domestic violence policies often highlight that employing 
victims of domestic violence can lead to violence in the workplace.48 
Likewise, many of the legal commentators who have discussed in de-
tail the effects of domestic violence on the workplace have focused on 
the legal liability that may be associated with workplace violence.49 
This emphasis is not surprising. Obviously, employers would like to 
avoid injuries to their employees. Serious incidents also tend to re-
sult in newspaper headlines and often litigation. Thus, such a focus 
clearly gets employers’ attention. But the constant refrain that do-
mestic violence may lead to workplace violence, especially when com-
bined with the widely-held tendency to blame victims for violence, 
distorts the overall picture and may contribute to the frequency with 
which victims are fired. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has found 
that domestic violence accounts for just 5 percent of all workplace 
violence, and workplace violence itself is relatively uncommon.50  
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 3 (finding 91 percent of employees believe that domestic violence affects the 
bottom line at their companies either “[a] lot” or “some” while just 43 percent of CEOs be-
lieve it affects their bottom line “[a] lot” or “some”).  
 48. See generally infra note 50. 
 49. See sources cited supra note 39. Both Julie Goldscheid and Nicole Buonocorte Por-
ter discuss the possibility that the risk employers perceive as associated with employing a 
victim of domestic violence may be inflated by bias or mere speculation. See Porter, supra 
note 39, at 328-30; Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 46.  
 50. See BLS REPORT, supra note 36. Five percent of businesses of all sizes reported an 
incident of workplace violence over a period of twelve months, with just under one percent 
of businesses reporting an incident related to domestic violence. Id. Twenty-four percent of 
the largest businesses (employing more than one thousand employees) reported a work-
place violence incident related to domestic violence. Id. This is obviously not a small num-
ber. However, remember that these employers likely employed many dozens or even hun-
dreds of victims of domestic violence, most of whom were not the target of workplace vio-
lence. Of course, it is important to recognize that workplace violence in general, and work-
place violence stemming from domestic violence in particular, may well be underreported. 
In fact, the definition of “workplace violence” used in the BLS study was relatively broad: 
physical assaults or threats of assault, harassment, intimidation, or bullying at work or 
while on duty. Id. The studies cited supra note 9, regarding prevalence of harassment of 
victims of domestic violence at work (much of which might fit within the BLS study’s defi-
nition of workplace violence), suggest that the BLS workplace violence study almost cer-
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 The two misperceptions reinforce each other. That is, employers 
don’t realize that they are in fact employing many victims of domes-
tic violence without experiencing any violent incidents at the work-
place. They are aware of (and understandably concerned about) the 
relatively rare instances in which domestic violence escalates to 
workplace violence. Therefore, if employers learn that a particular 
employee is a victim of domestic violence, they often respond by fir-
ing her, perhaps believing this is the best means of keeping the 
workplace safe. Observing such terminations, any other victims who 
are employed by the employer are even less likely to disclose what is 
occurring to them, further perpetuating management’s misperception 
that relatively few of the business’s employees are victims of domes-
tic violence. Finally, even companies that recognize that domestic 
violence does have significant effects on their business may feel that 
it is a private matter best left to employees or may not be aware that 
they can play a significant role in addressing the violence.51 Although 
such information gaps make it unlikely a purely market-based ap-
proach will adequately address the issue, legal reforms, as I suggest 
in Part V, should be consciously tailored to promote information ex-
change that would demonstrate that employers and employees do in 
fact have considerable shared interests.  
 The growing number of private employers that voluntarily adopt 
proactive policies designed to support employees who are victims of 
domestic violence and reduce the likelihood of violence occurring at 
the workplace confirms that addressing domestic violence can be in a 
business’s interest. This trend is due in part to successful efforts by 
nonprofit organizations, workplace violence experts, and businesses 
that have made addressing domestic violence a priority to educate 
corporate leaders more generally.52 Government researchers have 
                                                                                                                     
tainly undercounts incidents of workplace violence as it defines it. However, it seems likely 
that more serious incidents (that is, actual assaults) are those most likely to be reported of-
ficially and thus captured in the BLS report. Thus, the BLS study is probably correct that 
incidents of actual violence at work stemming from domestic violence are relatively un-
usual.  
 51. In the benchmark survey done by Liz Claiborne, CEOs identified several barriers 
to implementing domestic violence workplace programs, including that domestic violence 
was not perceived as a major issue at the company, concern over legal ramifications of be-
coming involved, concerns over being “overly involved” in employees’ personal lives, and 
lack of information about how domestic violence affected the workplace. CAEPV 2007 Sur-
vey, supra note 37, at 7. Eighty-one percent of CEOs agreed that most companies would be 
more willing to become involved if they had the “right program and tools to implement it.” 
Id. at 5. 
 52. The Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence (CAEPV), a private nonprofit 
group, is the most prominent organization supporting employers in such efforts. It defines 
its mission as to “aid in the prevention of partner violence by leveraging the strength and 
resources of the corporate community” and claims that its members and associate organi-
zations reach over one million employees nationwide. See Corporate Alliance to End Part-
ner Violence, CAEPV—Learn About Us, http://www.caepv.org/about/purpose.php (last vis-
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also played a role. The CDC, as part of its injury prevention man-
date, recently commissioned researchers to conduct an “inventory” of 
businesses that have taken a lead on the issue. The CDC report iden-
tifies the following steps as typical in an effective business response: 
promulgating a policy that specifically prohibits perpetrators from 
threatening or engaging in violence while at work and offers assis-
tance to victims; implementing security measures to reduce the risk 
of workplace violence associated with domestic violence; providing 
resources to victims of domestic violence; educating employees and 
managers about domestic violence, including how to recognize signs 
of domestic violence and where to refer victims for help; and offering 
services to perpetrators to reduce future violence.53  
 Businesses involved in the study indicated that their objectives in 
implementing such steps was “not only workplace safety but personal 
safety” for employees at home.54 They sought to increase the likeli-
hood that employees who were victims would “report” the violence so 
that safety planning would be possible and, of course, sought to 
minimize the productivity losses associated with the violence. Most 
companies create specialized “Domestic Violence Response Teams,” 
which include personnel from human resources, security, and legal 
departments to handle situations as they arise.55 Interestingly, none 
of the businesses inventoried measured the cost-effectiveness of their 
programs, indicating perhaps that their motivations were not pri-
                                                                                                                     
ited June 23, 2008). CAEPV distributes information related to domestic violence and do-
mestic violence prevention, publicizes best practices of its members, and provides targeted 
technical assistance to businesses seeking to develop domestic violence policies. Id. Domes-
tic violence service providers also often reach out directly to businesses to encourage them 
to take proactive steps. Safe Horizon, a large domestic violence service provider based in 
New York City, has recently launched an ambitious campaign called SafeWork 2010, 
which has the goal of securing pledges from at least two hundred Fortune 500 CEOs to 
make a commitment to address domestic violence in their own companies. See Chris Erick-
son, Reaching Out: Victim Advocates Say Domestic Violence Needs to Be Addressed at 
Work—and They’re out to Convince CEO’s [sic], N.Y. POST ONLINE EDITION, Oct. 1, 2007, 
http://www.nypost.com/seven/10012007/jobs/reaching_out.htm. For representative discus-
sions of the issue by experts on workplace violence generally, see, for example, 
BRAVERMAN, supra note 28; PALUDI ET AL., supra note 28; and Fisher & Peek-Asa, supra 
note 28. 
 53. CDC INVENTORY, supra note 38, §§ 1.2.1 to .6 (May 2006); see also, e.g., 
BRAVERMAN, supra note 28, at 87-89; PALUDI ET AL., supra note 28, at 81-83; Fisher & 
Peek-Asa, supra note 28, at 108-11 (all recommending similar strategies). Most policies in-
clude a clear statement that victims will not be discriminated against; the possibility of 
paid or unpaid leave to address the violence; the offer of assistance with safety measures; 
and prohibition of activities relating to the perpetration of domestic violence by employees 
at work or use of work materials. See Stacey Pastel Dougan & Kimberly K. Wells, Domestic 
Violence: Workplace Policies and Management Strategies, ABA COMM. ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE Q. E-NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar. Assoc., Chi., Ill.), Spring 2007, 
http://www.abanet.org/domviol/enewsletter/vol7/DouganWellsSpring2007.pdf. 
 54. CDC INVENTORY, supra note 38, § 3.2.1. 
 55. Id.  § 3, at 3-20; see also, e.g., Dougan & Wells, supra note 53; BRAVERMAN, supra 
note 28, at 88; Fisher & Peek-Asa, supra note 28, at 82.  
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marily, or at least not strictly, bottom-line oriented, but rather may 
reflect a commitment to facilitate employee wellbeing or play a posi-
tive role as corporate citizens.56  
 Legal reforms (broadly defined) can complement and encourage 
such voluntary action, as well as go beyond what individual employ-
ers can or would do. As discussed in Part IV, several individual 
states, as well as Congress, have developed model policies or funded 
initiatives to collect and disseminate policies that businesses have 
found effective. Supporting research to document cost savings and 
other business benefits could further spur voluntary business action. 
Second, legislation can spread costs among businesses and offer spe-
cific legal tools, such as the possibility of obtaining a “workplace re-
straining order,”57 which, like an individual victim’s civil restraining 
order, can reduce the risk of workplace violence. Third, because of 
the expressive power of legal reform, passing laws that protect vic-
tims of domestic violence from losing their jobs has an impact beyond 
the specific substantive protections they provide. It indicates a socie-
tal commitment to addressing domestic violence and its workplace ef-
fects that can help counter the stigma and stereotyping that may 
contribute to the information gaps described above. Finally, legisla-
tures may determine that as part of a larger commitment to address-
ing domestic violence they will mandate employment protections for 
victims that go beyond what individual businesses would choose to do 
on their own. The question then becomes whether and how to reim-
burse businesses for any costs incurred.58  
III.   PLACING WORKPLACE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW IN CONTEXT 
 Recognizing, as Part II does, that domestic violence has signifi-
cant effects on workplaces and that a legislative response is desirable 
does not answer what the appropriate substantive scope of such leg-
islation would be. The emerging body of legislation discussed in this 
                                                                                                                     
 56. CDC INVENTORY, supra note 38, § 4 app. A. Companies more typically evaluate ef-
fectiveness in terms of greater awareness of domestic violence resources. See, e.g., B. 
Younger Urban, Harman Internat’l Domestic Violence Prevention Project, Evaluation Re-
port (May 2004) (unpublished report, on file with author) (finding that after being trained 
on domestic violence, 91 percent of employees said they were more likely to know where to 
refer someone who is abused for help; 89 percent said they were more likely to be suppor-
tive of a colleague who is abused; and 86 percent said they were more aware of what to do 
if there is a threat of domestic violence at work).  
 57. See infra Part IV.E. 
 58. See infra Part V.D. Some might object that employers should not be forced to bear 
any costs associated with addressing domestic violence beyond making changes that are in 
their own economic interest. It remains, however, within legislatures’ authority to make 
such decisions, just as they regulate many other aspects of the employment relationship, 
including setting minimum wage and overtime rules, requiring accommodation of indi-
viduals with disabilities, etc. Further research into the economic (and potentially none-
conomic) costs and benefits of various approaches could help inform the debate.  
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Article builds on—and, equally importantly, departs from—more 
traditional “domestic violence” legislation and more traditional “em-
ployment” legislation. This Part briefly describes evolution of each 
these bodies of law to offer context for the new laws discussed in Part 
IV. It demonstrates that both domestic violence law and employment 
law have struggled with the extent to which society as a whole, or, in 
the employment context, employers, should bear responsibility for 
addressing or accommodating what have traditionally been consid-
ered “private” family matters. Domestic violence advocates have suc-
cessfully reframed domestic violence as a “public” problem, requiring 
a systemic response. As shown in Part IV, this reframing in turn in-
forms domestic violence employment law, as evidenced by a willing-
ness to impose costs on all employers or spread costs among employ-
ers, in sharp distinction to accommodations required by the employ-
ment laws discussed in this Part. 
A.   Legal Responses to Domestic Violence 
 Domestic violence has deep roots in the traditional patriarchal 
family structure. As recently as the nineteenth century, a man le-
gally owned his wife and had a right to chastise her physically for 
(purported) misconduct. Even after chastisement was no longer le-
gally sanctioned, “privacy” concerns served to shield domestic vio-
lence from court scrutiny.59 As Elizabeth Schneider observes, “It took 
the rebirth of feminism in the 1960s for the ‘rediscovery’ of batter-
ing.”60  
 As a result of dedicated advocacy, there has been a sea change in 
legal responses to domestic violence. The initial generation of legal 
reforms, begun in the 1970s, focused on two areas: family law and 
criminal law. Advocates successfully lobbied for statutory amend-
ments requiring the consideration of domestic violence in custody, 
visitation, and divorce proceedings, and for the creation of civil pro-
tective orders in every state.61 On the criminal law side, “mandatory 
arrest” laws, specialized domestic violence prosecution units, and use 
of strategies to encourage prosecutions even if the victim is unwilling 
or unable to participate, have dramatically increased domestic vio-
                                                                                                                     
 59. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (showing how even after wife beating was no longer of-
ficially legal, men who beat their wives were typically granted formal and informal immu-
nity from prosecution to protect the “privacy” of the family).   
 60. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 20 (2000). 
 61. See Barbara J. Hart, The Legal Road to Freedom, in BATTERING AND FAMILY 
THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE (Marsali Hansen & Michele Harway eds., 1993); see 
also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993).  
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lence prosecutions.62  
 Although the criminal law and family law that governs domestic 
violence is primarily a matter of state law, in 1994, Congress first 
passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), a multi-pronged 
federal strategy to combat domestic violence, dating violence, sexual 
assault, and stalking.63 VAWA created a private federal cause of ac-
tion for gender-based violence that was struck down by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Morrison as unconstitutional.64 Nonethe-
less, the rest of the original VAWA, as well as reauthorizations of 
VAWA in 2000 and 2005, remain good law. VAWA authorizes fund-
ing for a variety of domestic violence services, including training po-
lice departments, prosecutors, and both family and criminal law 
judges, as well as for representation of victims in civil proceedings.65 
VAWA also provides additional substantive legal rights for victims, 
including immigration protections for battered immigrants and anti-
discrimination protections for victims of domestic violence living in 
public or subsidized housing.66  
                                                                                                                     
 62. See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Fu-
ture of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1678-97 (discussing strategies 
employed). Recent Supreme Court decisions that shield police departments from liability 
for failing to comply with state mandatory arrest laws, see Town of Castle Rock v. Gonza-
les, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005), and that make it more difficult for prosecutors to rely on vic-
tims’ prior statements, see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), may lead to 
some backsliding. 
 63. Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 013-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (1994). VAWA was title IV of this Act.  
 64. 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).  
 65. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
119 Stat. 2960, Pub. L. No. 109-162 (2006). Training and legal services money, together 
with resources to meet immediate safety needs of victims by creating shelters and nonresi-
dential support programs, make up the bulk of VAWA funding. In fiscal year 2007, for ex-
ample, appropriations under VAWA and the related Family Violence Prevention and Ser-
vices Act totaled $557 million, including $156 million in “Services, Training, Officers, 
Prosecutors” (STOP) grants (grants usable to improve law enforcement response to violent 
crimes against women); $62 million in Grants to Encourage Arrests (grants usable to im-
plement pro-arrest policies); $39 million for civil legal assistance for victims; $39 million in 
services for rural victims; and $125 million for shelters and related services for battered 
women. See CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, VAWA 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, AND FISCAL YEAR 2008 REQUESTS 
(2007), available at http://www.naesv.org/Resources/approps102707.pdf. Other relatively 
large appropriations under VAWA include $15 million for transitional housing and $44 
million for rape prevention and education. Id. For more information on VAWA grant re-
quirements, see Office on Violence Against Women, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Laws 
and Legislation, http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/regulations.htm (last visited June 23, 2008). As 
noted below, see infra text accompanying note 159, VAWA 2005 authorized $1 million for 
creation of a federal clearinghouse to collect best practices by businesses.  
 66. See, e.g., Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, (2006), Title VIII (Protection of Battered and 
Trafficked Immigrants) & Title VI (Housing Opportunities and Safety for Battered Women 
and Children).  
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 Collectively, these reforms have dramatically improved the legal 
response to domestic violence and thus made countless victims safer. 
Nonetheless, as these reforms have been achieved, their limitations, 
particularly those related to the criminal justice system, have become 
apparent. As numerous commentators have observed, the move to a 
criminal justice focus, in which the state becomes the actor charged 
with addressing domestic violence, by its very terms takes control 
away from the victim.67 Relying on the criminal justice system also 
raises special concerns for women of color and immigrants.68 And 
criminal definitions of domestic violence focus on isolated incidents of 
physical violence, while many victims feel that other forms of emo-
tional abuse or manipulation are actually the more significant as-
pects of control.69 Similar concerns have been expressed regarding 
the emphasis on civil protective orders.70 And it is clear that bias and 
stereotypes limit the effectiveness of reforms in both areas.71 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Vio-
lence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 
293-304 (2005) (critiquing the reliance on mandatory arrest laws); Sack, supra note 62, at 
1678-97 (reviewing range of critiques of reliance on criminal justice system offered by bat-
tered women’s advocates); see also Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 
2, 21-22 (2006) (arguing that criminalization of violation of civil protective orders inappro-
priately authorizes the state to prosecute nonviolent behavior in the home); cf. Naomi 
Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (2000) (discussing tensions in criminalization of domestic violence in 
connection with other criminal liability that disproportionately affects women, including 
prostitution, child abuse and neglect, and sexual assault). 
 68. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Vio-
lence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 810-12 (2001); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1991); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence 
Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differ-
entials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 242-51 (1994). 
 69. See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Batter-
ing: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 962-65 
(2004) (arguing for redefinition of battering to criminalize a course of coercive and control-
ling conduct).  
 70. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on 
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 
504-05 (2003) (questioning whether focus on civil protective orders as means of protecting 
battered women is effective in increasing safety); Suk, supra note 67, at 57-58 (arguing 
that criminalization of violation of civil protective orders suggests that they too signifi-
cantly decrease victim autonomy). 
 71. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 657, 686-90 (2003) (describing role that bias against battered women as moth-
ers plays in custody determinations). Of course, it is not just judges, police officers, or 
prosecutors who can be biased. Representatives of employers are often biased too. Thus, 
implementation of the new employment laws may also be limited by bias and stereotype. 
Therefore, internal trainings as well as public education efforts must address head-on the 
potential distortion caused by common stereotypes regarding battering and battered 
women.  
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 The possibilities and challenges inherent in these reforms are the 
subject of extensive commentary, and they, obviously, are not the fo-
cus of this Article.72 Nor am I suggesting in any way that workplace 
legislation can or should replace criminal and family law in address-
ing domestic violence; these systems remain essential for many vic-
tims. There are, however, a few points related to this history that 
both help shape domestic violence employment legislation and dem-
onstrate how it can complement these other strategies. First, as sev-
eral other commentators have noted, a key strategy embraced by bat-
tered women’s advocates beginning in the 1970s was to redefine what 
had been characterized as a “private” family matter off limits from 
state intervention as a “public” problem requiring state enforcement 
of criminal laws to promote safety and punish wrongdoing.73 Their 
success in this respect has truly been remarkable, and I will argue 
that it plays a key role in distinguishing legislation addressing work-
place effects of domestic violence from legislation addressing other 
“family” issues that impact the workplace.  
 Second, both family law and criminal law reforms tend to encour-
age the victim of an abusive relationship to separate from the abuser. 
Thus, ensuring that a victim has a source of income independent of 
her abuser is extremely important to making these strategies effec-
tive. Additionally, workplace-based strategies may help victims who 
are unlikely or unwilling to use some of these other legal strategies, 
including victims who are taking steps to end the abuse but hope to 
remain in the relationship.  
 Third, as a society, we expend considerable resources in managing 
the effects of domestic violence and working to prevent future vio-
lence. If workplace interventions can play a significant role in reduc-
ing domestic violence, it may be appropriate to commit public funds 
to the effort. 
 Finally, somewhat distinct from the individual victim-rights-
based approach of the family law reforms or the emphasis on punish-
ing the perpetrator of criminal law reforms, there has also been a 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See supra notes 67-71.  
 73. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (1996) (“[M]uch of [the] 
feminist academic discourse concerning domestic violence has centered on the argument 
that ‘private’ violence must be reconceptualized as ‘public’ in order to compel state inter-
vention.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 984-85 
(1991) (“The concept of privacy encourages, reinforces and supports violence against 
women. . . . Privacy says that what goes on in . . . violent relationship[s] should not be the 
subject of state or community intervention. Privacy says that it is an individual, and not a 
systemic problem. Privacy operates as a mask for inequality, protecting male violence 
against women.” (emphasis added)); cf. Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of 
Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1671-72 (1990) (not-
ing that decisions by individual police officers or court clerks not to respond to domestic 
violence calls are “public” acts rather than “private” acts).  
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growing interest in addressing domestic violence as a public health 
crisis. As noted above, studies typically find that at least one in four 
women is a victim of domestic violence. Domestic violence typically 
causes serious physical and emotional injuries. The CDC has there-
fore implemented a variety of public health strategies to address the 
problem. These include documenting the extent of domestic violence, 
identifying risk and protective factors, developing and testing pre-
vention strategies, and then implementing effective strategies on a 
wide-scale basis.74 The public health paradigm likewise has helped 
shape emerging workplace legislation.  
B.   Relevant Employment Law Models and Critiques 
 The domestic violence employment laws also grow out of, and 
move beyond, traditional employment law. Thus, a brief description 
of the laws that have been the models for domestic violence laws, and 
of some of the critiques of that law that have become prevalent in re-
cent years, is helpful. 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the primary federal em-
ployment nondiscrimination law, provides that employers may not 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national ori-
gin.75 Courts have traditionally interpreted it primarily to guarantee 
“formal equality,” that is, that everyone must be treated the same.76 
In practice, this has meant, for example, that women must be treated 
the same as men and blacks the same as whites. This approach pre-
sumes that race, color, sex, and national origin are irrelevant in the 
workplace. In many cases, this is true. However, commentators have 
long recognized that a formal equality approach is not particularly 
effective at addressing situations in which salient distinctions might 
require that the structure of the workplace be changed in some fash-
ion; such commentators have articulated the need for a broader un-
derstanding of equality that includes providing necessary accommo-
dations to provide equal opportunity.77 Commentators have also in-
                                                                                                                     
 74. See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PROGRAM ACTIVITIES GUIDE, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/vaw.pdf (outlining the CDC’s prevention strate-
gies).  
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008). 
 76. The definition of discrimination on the basis of religion includes the failure to ac-
commodate religious observances and practice, unless doing so would impose an undue 
hardship on a business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008). Therefore, the protections of dis-
crimination on the basis of religion explicitly go beyond formal equality. Additionally, 
commentators have recently observed that in certain other respects Title VII’s antidis-
crimination provisions can require changing workplace structures or other accommoda-
tions. See infra note 81. 
 77. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION 
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the 
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creasingly suggested that traditional antidiscrimination protections, 
which generally require a showing of intentional discrimination, are 
ill-suited to combat more subtle forms of bias and structural barriers 
that often pose significant barriers to full participation of minorities 
and women in the workplace.78 
 In the 1990s, Congress passed two laws, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
that required employers to make specific changes in the workplace in 
response to employees’ particular needs. The FMLA provides eligible 
employees up to twelve weeks off in a twelve month period to care for 
their own or a family member’s “serious health condition,” or upon 
birth or adoption of a new child.79 The ADA requires employers to 
make “reasonable accommodations” for employees with disabilities.80 
The laws were perceived as groundbreaking because they were un-
derstood to be fundamentally distinct from nondiscrimination re-
quirements.81 In fact, the ADA and the FMLA were hailed as wel-
come harbingers of a larger transformation of the workplace to be 
more responsive to individual needs and a substantive equality 
analysis.82 As applied, however, they are now widely understood to 
have fallen far short of these expectations.83 Particularly in the case 
of the ADA, specific decisions have limited the reach of the statute 
and, while rarely made explicit, there seems to be an underlying con-
                                                                                                                     
ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-7 (2000). 
 78. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidis-
crimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324-45 
(1987); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460-61 (2001). 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2008). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2008). 
 81. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: 
Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2608-09, 2612 (1994); Samuel Issa-
charoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimina-
tion Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 312-20 
(2001); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reason-
able Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-14 (1996); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination 
and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840-55 (2001); Krieger, supra note 77, at 3-4; Stewart J. 
Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1200-04, 1209-12 (2003). 
 82. See generally, e.g., Krieger, supra note 77, at 3-4 (describing initial perceptions of 
the ADA). 
 83. Empirical studies of the ADA have demonstrated neutral to negative effects upon 
employment of individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People With Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 528 (2004) (“[N]o knowledgeable observer disputes . . . [that] the 
ADA has failed significantly to improve the employment position of people with disabili-
ties.”). Studies likewise suggest that the FMLA has had little impact. See Michael Selmi, 
The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 396 (1999) 
(“[T]he FMLA essentially replicated what the market was already providing—unpaid leave 
for large employers.”).  
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cern that the accommodation mandates—which are perceived as re-
quiring “special” treatment for specific individuals—are in tension 
with guarantees of equality.84  
 Both laws also reflect a deep-seated reluctance to impose costs as-
sociated with individual accommodations for employees on employ-
ers, at least small ones. The FMLA was passed despite strenuous 
business objections. When initially introduced in 1985, the FMLA 
would have covered all employers, no matter how small.85 That bill 
did not pass, and as the legislation was reintroduced over the next 
eight years, the proposed threshold gradually rose to fifteen employ-
ees, then twenty, then thirty-five, and then finally fifty employees, 
the threshold in the law actually enacted.86 The high employee 
threshold, combined with a requirement that employees have worked 
at least one year for their current employer and a requisite number 
of hours in the year prior to requesting leave, mean that about half 
the American workforce is not eligible to take FMLA leave.87 The 
ADA (like Title VII) only applies to employers with at least fifteen 
employees and further does not require accommodations that would 
cause an “undue hardship” on the employer.88  
 The willingness of Congress to accommodate business concerns 
regarding costs by limiting the reach of these laws may be in part be-
cause antidiscrimination mandates, with their focus on formal equal-
ity, are popularly perceived as costing employers (at least almost) 
nothing. After the passage of the FMLA and the ADA, Christine 
Jolls, Samuel Bagenstos, and other commentators challenged this as-
sumption, demonstrating persuasively that Title VII’s nondiscrimi-
nation requirements may impose costs that are equivalent to those 
imposed by “accommodation” mandates.89 Nonetheless, the percep-
                                                                                                                     
 84. See James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights 
Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8-
9 (2005). 
 85. See H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1985). 
 86. See Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 42-43 & n.221 (2007). 
 87. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2), (4) (2000); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Families and Employers in a 
Changing Economy, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/fmla/fmla/1995Report/summary.htm (re-
port finding that 46.5 percent of private sector workers and 54.9 percent of all U.S. work-
ers are eligible for FMLA leave); see also O’Leary, supra note 86, at 42-45 (demonstrating 
how the small business exception, probationary period exception, and part-time workers 
exception exclude a disproportionately high percentage of women and low-income workers). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000) (defining “undue hardship” as an accommodation 
that would require “significant difficulty or expense” when considered in relation to the 
size, resources, nature, and structure of the employer’s operation). 
 89. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, Accommodation and the Poli-
tics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 880-81 (2003) (arguing prohibition on 
intentional discrimination may require employers to make changes that are not economi-
cally rational); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
642, 652-66 (2001) (arguing that disparate impact cases under Title VII, which may re-
quire employers to change facially neutral policies, are economically equivalent to accom-
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tion remains that antidiscrimination laws cost employers “nothing” 
and that accommodation mandates are expensive to employers, lead-
ing legislatures to excuse smaller or resource poor employers from 
such requirements. As shown in Part IV, these limitations are trans-
ported to the domestic violence context in laws modeled on the ADA 
and FMLA, although other new domestic violence laws depart from 
this model to impose costs more generally. 
 Responding to the growing recognition of the limits of antidis-
crimination law and the disappointments of the accommodation 
mandates, employment law scholars currently tend to emphasize the 
need to understand legislation providing individual employment 
rights as part of a broader strategy to achieve larger objectives, par-
ticularly where success depends on changing workplace structures or 
societal norms. For example, in a prominent article arguing for paid 
family leave legislation, Gillian Lester notes that addressing gender 
inequities in the work world and in family care-giving responsibili-
ties requires “composite . . . interlocking social policies,” including 
high quality affordable child care, effective antidiscrimination laws, a 
shorter work week, and changes to income tax policies, as well as 
paid family leave.90 In another influential example, Susan Sturm 
demonstrates how employers need to engage in problem solving to 
address “second generation” discrimination problems such as struc-
tural bias, and she argues that rather than focusing on specific rules, 
the law should help shape normative expectations and establish pre-
sumptions that will encourage employers to creatively address the 
problem.91 She emphasizes the role that intermediary organizations 
such as human resources professionals, insurance companies, and 
nonprofit organizations can play in developing company policies.92 
Such intuitions are likewise true in the domestic violence context, 
                                                                                                                     
modation mandates); see also, e.g., Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, Ac-
commodation and Universal Mandates—Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 111, 137-39 (2003); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 583-84 (2004); J. H. Verk-
erke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1385, 1401-02 (2003) (each building on Jolls’ analysis to argue that nondiscrimination and 
accommodation mandates are more properly understood as overlapping than distinct). But 
see Schwab & Willborn, supra note 81, at 1200-01 (disagreeing with Jolls’ conclusions and 
arguing that accommodations are fundamentally different).   
 90. Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 4-5 
(2005); see also, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 
(2004) (arguing that the limited impact of the ADA is the result of “the inability of antidis-
crimination laws to eliminate the deep structural barriers to employment that people with 
disabilities face” and arguing instead for expanded social welfare benefits). 
 91. Sturm, supra note 78, at 520-22; see also generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM 
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 157-95 
(2004) (reviewing recent critiques of the possibility of traditional employment discrimina-
tion law to address discrimination in the contemporary workplace). 
 92. Sturm, supra note 78, at 522-37. 
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where effective solutions require flexibility and creative problem 
solving by businesses and where individual rights-based legislation 
must be complemented by other social policies.  
IV.   THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE WORKPLACE EFFECTS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 In the past ten years, there has been an explosive growth of state 
laws, executive orders, and administrative guidelines addressing the 
effects of domestic violence in the workplace. This Part offers a de-
tailed discussion of the new laws. Although other commentators have 
noted the rapid expansion of domestic violence employment laws, 
and particularly their potential import for poor women,93 none has 
comprehensively evaluated their substantive contours. Analysis of 
the new laws reveals two common challenges. First is how to deal 
with the fact that employment laws, by their nature, most obviously 
regulate a relationship between the employer and the victim, while 
the perpetrator is the cause of workplace disruptions and violence, as 
well as, less directly, a victim’s absences. Second, and relatedly, be-
cause ultimate responsibility rests most clearly with the perpetrator, 
the question of how to assign costs associated with any employment-
related accommodations is particularly difficult.  
 These challenges are not unique to the domestic violence context. 
In fact, the debate over “accommodation” mandates such as the 
FMLA and the ADA focused in large part on the question of whether 
and to what extent employers could be asked to bear the costs of such 
changes. The striking thing about the emerging domestic violence 
laws is that they answer these questions in dramatically different 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See Naomi Cahn & Michael Selmi, Women and the “New” Corporate Governance: 
The Class Ceiling, 65 MD. L. REV. 435 (2006); Naomi Cahn & Michael Selmi, Women in the 
Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7 (2006) (both 
discussing growth of domestic violence employment legislation as a strategy for restructur-
ing the balance between work and family, with particular salience for low-income women);  
see also Goldscheid, supra note 43 (advocating expansion of antidiscrimination protec-
tions); Ralph Henry, Domestic Violence and the Failures of Welfare Reform: The Role for 
Work Leave Legislation, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 67 (2005) (advocating expanding leave op-
tions for victims as a counterpoint to welfare reform legislation); Tarr, supra note 43 (advo-
cating expansion of employment protections for victims and providing detailed discussion 
of Illinois’s domestic violence employment legislation); Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. 
Widiss, Employment Protections for Domestic Violence Victims, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 
May-June 2004, at 3 (offering overview of new legislation). But see Marta B. Varela, Protec-
tion of Domestic Violence Victims Under the New York City Human Rights Law’s Provisions 
Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1231 (2000) 
(arguing against a then proposed, now enacted, New York City law on the ground that ex-
isting disability law was sufficient to protect victims). Additionally, in a thoughtful piece 
using domestic violence as a case study for an employment law class, Lea B. Vaughn asks 
students to imagine different potential frames for the issue and touches on some of the 
questions of appropriate scope of legislation in this area that are central to this Article. See 
Lea B. Vaughn, Victimized Twice—The Intersection of Domestic Violence and the Work-
place: Legal Reform Through Curriculum Development, 47 LOY. L. REV. 231 (2001).  
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fashions. Some laws, modeled on the FMLA and the ADA, adopt their 
provisions limiting coverage to relatively large or resource-rich em-
ployers. But others, particularly those that grow out of a criminal 
justice or public health focus, either impose costs on all employers or 
develop mechanisms to spread costs across employers. In other 
words, the particular history of legislative responses to domestic vio-
lence, reviewed in Part III, and its shift to the perception of domestic 
violence as a public problem requiring systemic solutions, seems to 
shape in significant ways the employment-based strategies develop-
ing now. In turn, the variety of mechanisms employed in the domes-
tic violence employment legislation may offer suggestions for tackling 
other work-family issues for which existing models have proven in-
adequate.  
 This Part begins with an analysis of laws providing time off to vic-
tims, where the split according to model is most evident. It then 
turns to laws addressing the termination of victims and the need to 
make workplace modifications, assessing the promise and limitation 
of traditional employment law models as well as other approaches 
being used. Finally, it discusses statutes permitting employers to 
seek their own injunctive relief against perpetrators of actual or 
threatened workplace violence, statutes providing unemployment in-
surance benefits to employees who separate from jobs because of do-
mestic violence, and government actions encouraging the develop-
ment of domestic violence policies.  
A.   Domestic Violence Leave Legislation 
 As noted above, a victim typically will need some time off from 
work to take steps to address the domestic violence.94 To understand 
the significance of laws providing job-protected leave to victims of 
domestic violence, it is essential to recognize that employers in this 
country are not required to give their workers sick leave, vacation 
time, or any other right to return to a job after an absence. And many 
do not. Almost half (47 percent) of private sector workers have no 
paid sick days;95 the working poor are disproportionately disadvan-
taged.96 The FMLA provides job-protected leave for employees who 
work for large employers. However, since FMLA leave is only avail-
able for employees with a “serious health condition,” it generally 
cannot be used for employees with short-term health needs, such as a 
common cold or, more relevantly, a black eye or sprained wrist; nor 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.  
 95. VICKY LOVELL, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, NO TIME TO BE SICK: WHY 
EVERYONE SUFFERS WHEN WORKERS DON’T HAVE PAID SICK LEAVE 1 (2004).  
 96. JODY HEYMAN, THE WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN 
JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT  132-34 (2000). 
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can it be used for nonmedical domestic violence-related needs..97 
Thus, in the absence of legislative protection, a victim of domestic 
violence who misses work to go to court or meet with a counselor to 
do safety planning typically knows that her absence could cause her 
to lose her job. Since an independent income stream may be at least 
as important to her safety as any of these other help-seeking steps, 
the rational choice for many victims is to forego taking such meas-
ures in order to ensure ongoing employment.  
 Several states have responded to this problem by passing legisla-
tion, which I will refer to as “domestic violence leave legislation,” 
that specifically provides victims a right to take time off from their 
work without losing their jobs. As of June 2008, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, New York, North Carolina, 
Oregon, and Washington have laws that specifically provide victims 
of domestic violence job-protected leave from work to take steps—at 
least participating in a criminal proceeding or obtaining a civil pro-
tective order—to address the violence.98 These state laws provide un-
paid leave, although some permit a victim to choose to use (or an em-
ployer to require that the employee use) accrued paid leave to cover 
the absence. Additionally, in March 2008, the District of Columbia 
passed the country’s first legislation requiring employers to provide 
paid time off to victims of domestic violence to take steps to address 
the violence.99  
 In addition to permitting victims to take time off to go to court, 
the domestic violence leave laws typically cover additional immediate 
needs a victim may face: relocating to a new home or safe location 
and receiving treatment for medical conditions or psychological coun-
seling to address the effects of the violence. Of course providing job-
protected leave raises the possibility of employee abuse; the enacted 
                                                                                                                     
 97. This is not to say that victims who have qualifying “serious health conditions” 
caused by domestic violence cannot take leave under the FMLA. See, e.g., Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Gregg, 101 P.3d 181, 190 (Ak. 2004) (finding employee eligible for FMLA 
leave due to conditions resulting from a combination of her pregnancy, a car accident, and 
a “high level of emotional stress” stemming from domestic violence); see also LEGAL 
MOMENTUM, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: MEDICAL LEAVE FOR SURVIVORS AND FAMILY MEMBERS 
(2005), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/self%20and%20family%20member%20leave. 
pdf?docID=545. Additionally, modified schedules or leave is sometimes required as a “reason-
able accommodation” under the ADA or state disability statutes. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, 
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: DISABLED VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/disabilities%20accomodations.pdf?docID=305.  
 98. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230 & 230.1 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.7 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. § 741.313 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-72 (2007); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-
180/45 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132 (2006);  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850 (2007); 
2007 Or. Laws ch. 180 (enacted, to be codified in OR. REV. STAT. ch. 659A); 2008 Wash. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 286 (West) (enacted, to be codified in WASH. REV. CODE tit. 49). 
 99. Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008, 55 D.C. Reg. 3452 (Apr. 4, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20080311113451.pdf. The 
Washington D.C. law will also provide paid sick days for employees.  
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statutes include certification provisions which permit employers to 
ask for “proof” documenting that the individual is in fact a victim of 
domestic violence and is using the leave for a purpose authorized un-
der the statute.100 Collectively, these laws mean that more than a 
quarter of U.S. employees work in a state that provides an affirma-
tive right to take time off to address domestic violence.101  
 In drafting and lobbying for such laws, advocates naturally looked 
to existing legal models. One obvious model was the FMLA, the only 
federal statute that provides employees a right to job-protected leave, 
and state analogues. As discussed above, the FMLA provides up to 
twelve weeks off work to address “serious health conditions,” but it 
only applies to employers with at least fifty employees.102 
 The other model that advocates looked to in drafting domestic vio-
lence leave laws was a group of state laws that provide that employ-
ers cannot discriminate against or penalize employees who are vic-
tims of crime for absences from work to attend criminal trials or, in 
many cases, who conferred with the police or the district attorney in 
preparation for a trial.103 The laws, which I will call “crime victim job 
protection” laws, were passed gradually over the past twenty-five 
years, picking up speed as the victims’ rights movement gained mo-
mentum.104  
                                                                                                                     
 100. The “proof” requirements vary but generally permit a victim to provide any of a 
variety of documents, including a civil protective order, police report, medical records, or a 
statement from a professional who has assisted the victim in addressing the situation. See, 
e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/20(c) (2006). Additionally, while fraud remains theoretically 
possible, the fact that most of the statutes simply provide unpaid leave (or permit use of 
otherwise available paid leave) further mitigates against abuse. 
 101. As will be discussed in greater detail below, because of high employee thresholds 
built into many of these leave laws, they actually reach a smaller proportion of the work-
force. Additionally, Christine Jolls has demonstrated that the actual benefit to employees 
of such mandates depends on whether and how costs associated with the mandates may be 
passed on to the employees. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 223 (2000). The domestic violence leave laws fit within Jolls’ model of “accommoda-
tion” laws in that they provide benefits to a discrete class of employees. Id. at 231-32. Ac-
cording to Jolls, the value of the benefit will depend on whether employers are barred from 
reducing wages or employment levels of employees receiving time off under such provi-
sions. Id. at 243-61. Without binding protections, Jolls argues that such benefits may actu-
ally work to the detriment of those ostensibly “protected.” Id. at 257-61. This is important 
because domestic violence victims are not a protected class under federal or most state 
antidiscrimination law. Thus, theoretically, an employer could lower wages of victims to 
offset the cost of providing the leave. As a practical matter, however, such a reaction is 
unlikely, and it would probably be in violation of antidiscrimination provisions built into 
the leave laws. Additionally, a policy of lowering wages of domestic violence victims or re-
fusing to hire them would probably violate Title VII because it would have a disparate im-
pact on women. 
 102. See supra notes 79 & 87 and accompanying text. 
 103. These laws are closely related to (and sometimes part of) provisions that similarly 
provide that employees cannot be discharged or penalized for missing work to serve on a 
jury. These, too, typically apply to all employers, no matter how small. 
 104. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a nonpartisan 
body made up of commissioners appointed by states, promulgated a model “Victims of 
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 As of June 2008, there are at least thirty-four states that have 
crime victim job protection laws.105 They are generally housed in the 
criminal law, courts, judicial procedure, or evidence sections of state 
codes, rather than in the employment sections—and thirty-one of the 
thirty-four cover all employers, no matter how small. While they 
might be said to be motivated primarily by an interest in ensuring ef-
fective prosecution of crime (and many are enforceable by criminal 
prosecution), most of these laws also explicitly include a private 
cause of action and even attorneys’ fees. Generally speaking, the 
crime victim laws do not specify a certain number of days of job-
guaranteed leave that an individual has a “right” to take off; rather, 
they specify that employers may not penalize employees for partici-
pating in the prosecution of the crime, which has the indirect effect of 
permitting victims to take what is in essence job-guaranteed leave.  
 Analyzing the domestic violence leave laws that have been passed 
reveals a striking pattern: those that are modeled most closely on the 
FMLA, specifying the right at interest as a certain number of days of 
leave, also, like the FMLA, only apply to employers with at least fifty 
employees.106 This is true even when the amount of leave provided is 
                                                                                                                     
Crime Act” in 1992, which includes relatively broad employment rights protecting employ-
ees from being penalized for attending a criminal justice proceeding if “attendance is rea-
sonably necessary to protect the interests of the victim” or to participate in preparation for 
a criminal justice proceeding. UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 207 (1992), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uvca92.htm. The model applies to all em-
ployers. The model language was adopted in Arkansas and Delaware exactly; it is very 
similar to language enacted in several other states.  
 105. See ALA. CODE § 15-23-81 (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.017 (2007); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-4439 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
4.1-303(8) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b (2007); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 621-10.5 
(2007); IND. CODE § 35-44-3-11.1 (2007); IOWA CODE § 915.23 (2007); MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. 
PROC. § 11-102 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(l) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
780.790 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN § 611A.036 (2007); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-43-45 (2007); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209.1(14) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205(3) (2007); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 50.070 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.62 (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14 
(2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-17 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (2004); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 659A.192 (2005); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4957 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-13 
(2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (2007); UT. CODE § 78-11-26; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 
5313 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 103.87 (2007); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-40-209(a) (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 203(e) (2008). My research identified 
just three general crime victim laws—Arizona’s, adopted in 2001, Oregon’s, adopted in 
2003, and Rhode Island’s, adopted in 2004—that do include an employee-threshold and an 
undue hardship exception. The Oregon law has a six-employee threshold; the Arizona and 
Rhode Island laws, which are substantively identical, each include a fifty-employee thresh-
old. The latter laws are also strikingly different from the typical crime victim law in other 
ways; in fact, they “look” much more like the FMLA. 
 106. Compare Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000) (an eli-
gible employee “shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month 
period”) with COL. REV. STAT. 24-34-402.7 (2007) (“An employer shall permit an employee 
to request and take up to three working days of leave from work in any twelve-month pe-
riod.”), FLA. STAT. § 741.313 (2007) (Employers “shall permit an employee to request and 
take up to 3 working days of leave from work in any 12-month period . . . .”), 820 ILL. 
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far less than the twelve weeks provided by the FMLA and could eas-
ily be borne by much smaller employers. For example, Colorado and 
Florida’s domestic violence leave laws, structured like the FMLA, 
permit just three days of leave.107 In fact, although the Illinois and 
Colorado laws were both initially introduced with lower employee 
thresholds that were raised to fifty during political negotiation, more 
recently introduced bills in Massachusetts,108 Pennsylvania,109 New 
Jersey,110 and Oklahoma111 that follow this general model were intro-
duced with the high fifty-employee threshold.112 Proposed federal leg-
islation in this area has also tended to be modeled on the FMLA and 
adopt either a fifteen-employee or fifty-employee threshold.113 
 By contrast, domestic violence leave laws that are modeled on the 
crime victim job protection laws—that is, as prohibitions on punitive 
actions by an employer against an employee who takes “reasonable 
time off” to address domestic violence—generally, also like the crime 
                                                                                                                     
COMP. STAT. 180/20(A)(2) (2006) (qualified employees “shall be entitled to a total of 12 
workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”), and MIAMI-DADE CTY., FLA. CODE § 
11A-61 (“Employees . . .  shall be entitled to a total of thirty (30) work days of unpaid do-
mestic leave during any twelve (12) month period . . . .”).  
 107. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.7; FLA. STAT. § 741.313. 
 108. See S.B. 2338, 184th Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2006).  
 109. H.B. 89, 190th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2007-08). 
 110. A.B. 434 & S.B. 1194, 212th Leg. (N.J. 2006). Interestingly, a more recently intro-
duced bill in New Jersey that would provide 20 days leave was introduced without an em-
ployee-threshold. A.B. 573, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2008). 
 111. S.B. 549, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007). 
 112. For a  listing of pending bills in this area, see LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW 
GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2008), 
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/Employment_Rights.May.08.pdf?docID=2721 .  
 113. Two bills introduced in the 110th Congress would explicitly provide leave to vic-
tims for a variety of domestic violence-related needs. See Survivors’ Empowerment and 
Economic Security Act, S.1136, 110th Cong. (2007)  (SEES Act); Security and Financial 
Empowerment (SAFE) Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. (2007). These bills, as well as similar 
legislation introduced as SAFE or the Victims Economic Security and Safety Act (VESSA) 
in earlier Congresses, are largely modeled on the FMLA. SEES/SAFE, as introduced, 
would provide up to thirty days unpaid leave and apply to all employers with at least fif-
teen employees. Comparable leave provisions were also included in the bipartisan Senate 
version of the 2005 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, S. 1197, recom-
mended by the Senate Judiciary committee in June 2005. Importantly, however, political 
pressures dictated that the employee threshold in that bill be raised to fifty employees. 
Even with these adjustments designed to increase support for the provisions, they were not 
included in the bill that was ultimately enacted. See Violence Against Women and De-
partment of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.  L. No. 109-169, 119 Stat. 2960 
(2006). Additionally, a bill has recently been introduced that would amend the FMLA to 
provide leave to employees to attend criminal proceedings related to violent crimes (includ-
ing domestic violence crimes) against them or immediate family members. See Crime Vic-
tims Employment Leave Act, H.R. 5845, 110th Cong. (2008). This bill proposes what would 
in essence be a crime victim job-protection law. However, as an amendment to the FMLA, 
it would only apply to employers with at least fifty employees and employees who meet 
that law’s hour and longevity requirements. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. As 
such, it is a significant departure from a more comprehensive approach that has been 
taken by most states that have enacted crime victim job protection laws. See supra note 
105 and accompanying text. 
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victim leave laws, have no employee threshold, although some permit 
leave to be limited if it would be an undue burden or hardship on the 
employer. In other words, in most states that have passed these laws, 
all employers, no matter how small, are expected to permit their em-
ployees to take key steps to address domestic violence. Laws in Kan-
sas,114 Oregon,115 Maine,116 and Washington117 provide reasonable 
time off to take any of a range of steps to address domestic violence. 
North Carolina and New York have passed narrower protections that 
simply provide that employers cannot penalize victims for taking rea-
sonable time off to obtain a protective order.118 Although these laws 
typically are not as detailed as the domestic violence leave laws mod-
eled on the FMLA, each does include a mechanism for private en-
forcement either in court or in an agency.  
 The pattern is not absolute. A few states have enacted interesting 
hybrids. California first amended an existing crime victim job protec-
tion law—which, as is typical, did not specify a certain number of 
days and was applicable to all employers—to permit employees to 
take time off to obtain civil protective orders; it subsequently added a 
separate section, only applicable to larger employers, that permits 
victims to take leave to seek medical attention, obtain services from a 
domestic violence shelter or program or rape crisis center, obtain 
psychological counseling, participate in safety planning, or relo-
cate.119 Hawaii mandates that all employers, no matter how small, 
provide up to five days off and that larger employers provide up to 
thirty days off.120 Washington D.C.’s paid leave law will require all 
employers to provide at least three days off, employers with between 
twenty-five and ninety-nine employees to provide five days off, and 
employers with more than 100 employees to provide seven days off.121  
 The domestic violence leave laws modeled on the FMLA and those 
modeled on the crime victim laws provide substantively similar bene-
fits: they permit domestic violence victims to take time off from work 
                                                                                                                     
 114. H.B. 2928, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2006) (not yet codified). Kansas’s law provides 
“reasonable time off” and then specifies that this includes up to eight days unpaid leave in 
addition to any available paid leave. 
 115. S.B. 946, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Or. 2007) (enacted, to be codified in OR. REV. 
STAT. § 659A). Oregon’s domestic violence leave law, like its crime victim leave law, covers 
employers with at least six employees and permits employers to refuse or limit leave if it 
would be an “undue hardship.” Id.  
 116. ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 26, § 850 (2007). Maine’s law permits employers to refuse 
to provide leave if they can establish that it would be an “undue burden.” Id. 
 117. 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 286 (West) (enacted, to be codified in WASH. REV. 
CODE tit. 49).  
 118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5.5 (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.15 (2007).  
 119. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230-230.1 (2006).  
 120. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-72 (2007). 
 121. Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008, 55 D.C. Reg. 3452 (Apr. 4, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20080311113451.pdf. The 
Washington D.C. law will also provide paid sick days for employees. 
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to take necessary steps to address the violence. Nonetheless, the 
“model” used for the law seems to lead to dramatically different re-
sults regarding employer coverage. Of course, surveying the land-
scape of the laws as enacted cannot fully explicate the specific politi-
cal negotiations and strategies that yielded them; each, necessarily, 
is the result of a balancing of various interests by state legisla-
tures.122 Indeed, the pattern may be nothing more than a kind of 
“path dependency,” wherein a law that looks like the FMLA triggers 
an assumption that its coverage should also mirror the FMLA. But I 
think the difference may be attributable in large part to the per-
ceived scope of the interests at stake. Structuring the benefit as an 
individual right to a certain number of days off invites weighing the 
benefit to the employee against the employer’s resources and excus-
ing smaller employers. Framing the interest at stake instead as fur-
thering a larger public interest shifts the balance and seems to make 
it easier for legislatures to ask all employers to play a role. Thus 
building on a crime victims frame, fitting clearly within the refram-
ing of domestic violence as a “public” matter requiring systemic solu-
tions, seems to give legislatures some comfort in imposing the re-
quirement to provide time off on all employers.  
B.   Antidiscrimination Provisions 
 As noted in Part II, it is common for victims of domestic violence 
to be fired simply because the employer feels uncomfortable with 
domestic violence, blames the victims for the situation, or sees ter-
mination as the only means of reducing the “risk” of workplace har-
assment or violence. This reality means that victims are, with good 
reason, often afraid to tell their employers about what is going on at 
home. Additionally, some may feel that obtaining protective orders or 
taking other steps to address the violence could jeopardize their em-
ployment. This is counterproductive. Although privacy laws, and ap-
propriate respect for victims’ autonomy, generally mean that em-
ployers should not adopt policies that require victims to disclose that 
they are experiencing domestic violence,123 employers and employees 
                                                                                                                     
 122. More generally, it is impossible to infer a single legislative “intent”; different legis-
lators may cast their votes for a bill for very different reasons. But the significant patterns 
revealed are striking. Just as empirical studies of case results can help us understand pat-
terns and tensions in how laws are applied by courts, “empirical” studies of legislative “re-
sults” (that is, laws that are actually enacted) can help us understand patterns and ten-
sions in how laws are created by legislatures.  
 123. Domestic violence advocates tend to share a belief that the victim is best posi-
tioned to assess the probability that an abuser will take various actions. Accordingly, some 
victims may be relatively sure that there is little to no likelihood that they would be at-
tacked at work and have no reason to “alert” their employers to this highly speculative 
risk. In general, it is sound policy to make the workplace a safe place for disclosure but 
also to not pry into individuals’ personal lives. 
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are better off if victims know they can ask for help at work if neces-
sary without jeopardizing their employment. Additionally, there is an 
independent interest in ensuring that victims are not fired simply 
because an employer is uncomfortable with domestic violence or 
blames the victim for the situation (as discussed more fully in Part V, 
somewhat different considerations come into play when ongoing vio-
lence may pose a particularized threat to the workplace).  
 Responding to the concern that victims are often fired, Illinois, 
New York City, and Westchester County, N.Y., have made discrimi-
nation against victims of domestic violence specifically illegal, just as 
they prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, or 
sex.124 In recent years, several other states, including California, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma have introduced 
provisions similar to that enacted in New York City, Westchester 
County, and Illinois.125  
 Where in place, such laws undoubtedly provide welcome job secu-
rity to employees who are victims of domestic violence, and they 
should make it safer for employees to ask employers for assistance.126 
But the antidiscrimination model is something of a strange “fit” for 
the problem and, more to the point, only a partial fix. First, domestic 
violence victims often need flexibility from their employers or specific 
                                                                                                                     
 124. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/30 (2006); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.1 (2007); 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CODE §§ 700.02, 700.03 (2007). Illinois’ and New York City’s provi-
sions are technically separate from their more general antidiscrimination laws, but they 
track the general language quite closely. Connecticut and Rhode Island have enacted nar-
rower provisions, as part of their criminal codes, that prohibit employer discrimination 
against victims for having obtained a protective order (and, in Rhode Island’s law, specifi-
cally also prohibits discrimination against victims for choosing not to obtain a protective 
order). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 12-28-10 (2007). It is also im-
portant to note that the “domestic violence leave laws,” discussed supra Part IV.A, make it 
illegal to discriminate against victims for taking time off. However, they do not explicitly 
offer general discrimination protections. Although one might reasonably argue that legisla-
tures could be assumed to have intended the antidiscrimination language in the leave laws 
to extend to pure “status” discrimination (since it makes little sense to provide that an in-
dividual who asks for time off is protected but one who does not need time off is not), at 
least one court has implicitly rejected such arguments. See Imes v. City of Asheville, 606 
S.E.2d 117, 118 (N.C. 2004) (issuing summary affirmance of dismissal of wrongful dis-
charge claim brought by victim of domestic violence); Brief for Legal Momentum et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 15-19, Imes, 606 S.E.2d 117 (No. 250A04) 
(arguing that statutory protections would be rendered virtually meaningless if state law 
were interpreted to permit an individual to be fired simply because she is a victim) (as an 
attorney at Legal Momentum, I was a counsel on the amicus brief). 
 125. For citations to and descriptions of pending and recent bills, see LEGAL 
MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE , supra note 112.   
 126. Like other antidiscrimination laws, these laws prohibit discrimination against vic-
tims because of their situation; they do not mean that employers cannot terminate or oth-
erwise discipline employees for performance problems related to domestic violence, so long 
as they do so consistently (that is, so long as they would take the same action against other 
employees with comparable performance problems that are unrelated to domestic vio-
lence).  
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workplace modifications to address their situations. The general 
principle of formal equality as developed under Title VII law, how-
ever, encourages employers to treat everyone the “same”; employers 
are well served by taking no notice of protected classifications. Thus, 
using Title VII’s antidiscrimination provisions as the model for struc-
turing protections for domestic violence victims could have the unin-
tended effect of discouraging employers from providing employees 
who are victims of domestic violence with the flexibility they need.127  
 Second, unlike race or sex, “domestic violence victim status” is not 
a personal characteristic: it is a descriptive statement regarding a 
certain kind of criminal or controlling behavior to which an individ-
ual has been subjected. Thankfully, domestic violence victim “status” 
is not immutable; individuals successfully move past violent relation-
ships and become domestic violence survivors. The fact that domestic 
violence victim status is not immutable has limited salience. Al-
though immutability is often described as a hallmark of Title VII’s 
employment protections, Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimi-
nation makes clear that it is not strictly required, and state employ-
ment discrimination laws increasingly reach other “statuses” that 
are more transitory or voluntary, such as marital status, military 
service, and arrest or conviction records.128  
 Rather, recognizing that domestic violence victim “status” is not a 
personal characteristic is significant because many victims face dis-
cipline or termination not because of their “status,” or even because 
of a diffuse fear that they may “lure” violence towards the workplace, 
but very specifically because their abuser’s harassing conduct inter-
feres with the efficient operation of the business. This common sce-
nario is not (necessarily) covered by a standard discrimination pro-
tection, in part because it has no precise analogue in typical dis-
crimination because of race, sex, or other paradigmatic protected 
classes.129 Illinois and New York City address this vulnerability by 
                                                                                                                     
 127. As a technical matter, treating domestic violence victims differently, and arguably 
“better,” than other employees should not give rise to an employment discrimination claim 
because not being a victim is not a protected status. Nonetheless, under formal equality 
doctrines, employers may be uncomfortable providing benefits for an individual, based on 
that individual’s membership in a protected class, that they do not provide for others. Cf. 
Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of Right?, 
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 598-600 (2002) (making a similar argument with respect to 
the limitations of defining “parental status” as a protected class).  
 128. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. L. § 296 (1)(a) (McKinney 2008) (marital status and military 
service), (15) (previous convictions) & (16) (arrests not resulting in convictions). 
 129. This concern is related to, but somewhat distinct from, the question of whether Ti-
tle VII covers claims of associational discrimination, such as discrimination against a 
white employee because of his marriage to a black woman. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Col-
lege, No. 06-3815, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6897, *21-24 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing split of 
authorities on whether such claims are cognizable under Title VII). In the Title VII con-
text, courts permitting the claim tend to emphasize that discrimination against the indi-
vidual employee is “because of race,” and thus covered under Title VII, because it is the dif-
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defining discrimination to include actions taken against a victim be-
cause of disruptions or threats from the perpetrator of violence 
against her.130 But Westchester County law and other proposed bills 
have not similarly explicitly provided that prohibited discrimination 
would include acts taken against the victim because of her perpetra-
tor’s actions. While a court might find the concept implicit in protec-
tions for the victim, there is a possibility that even if a jurisdiction 
enacts “status” discrimination protections, such a law would be in-
adequate to address one of the most common “justifications” for fir-
ing victims.131  
 The other significant problem with turning to antidiscrimination 
models to protect victims from termination is that, as a practical re-
ality, proposing domestic violence victim status as an additional pro-
tected class predisposes businesses to oppose such bills.132 This is 
                                                                                                                     
ference between the employee’s race and that of the person with whom he is associating 
that gives rise to the discriminatory treatment. See id. The domestic violence situation 
presents a somewhat different question because firing a victim because of a perpetrator’s 
violent actions is arguably distinct from the specific basis (“domestic violence victim 
status”) on which protection is provided. Unlike Title VII, the ADA specifically prohibits 
associational discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000) (making it unlawful under 
the ADA to “exclude[e] or otherwise deny[] equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual 
because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is 
known to have a relationship or association”). The ADA provisions are also not precisely 
analogous to the domestic violence context since, in the ADA context, the discrimination 
occurs because of the disability (that is, protected status) of the nonemployee with whom 
the individual employee has a relationship. 
 130. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/30(a)(2) (2006) (prohibited discriminatory conduct 
includes conduct against an individual because “the workplace is disrupted or threatened 
by the action of a person whom the individual states has committed or threatened to com-
mit domestic or sexual violence against the individual or the individual’s family or house-
hold member”); see also N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107.1 (2007) (containing similar prohibi-
tions against discriminatory conduct). 
 131. On the other hand, a determination that a standard antidiscrimination provision 
does make it illegal to fire a victim based on the actions of a perpetrator raises the opposite 
question of whether there are situations where the risk of workplace violence is so severe 
that terminating the victim’s employment should be permitted. In this respect, the domes-
tic violence context raises questions that are related to, but again distinct from, threats to 
safety that may be posed by employment of certain individuals with disabilities. The ADA 
and its regulations permit employers to adopt job requirements that prohibit employment 
of an individual who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others 
in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2008). This is 
not a perfect analog because in the domestic violence context, it is not the individual victim 
herself that poses the threat but the perpetrator who threatens to commit violence against 
her or her co-workers. Nonetheless, at least one commentator has borrowed from the ADA 
context to suggest that employers should be able to terminate a victim if there is a “direct 
threat” to the workplace. See Porter, supra note 39, at 329-30. As described in Part V, I 
propose a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond a simple antidiscrimination mandate 
to balance these various competing concerns. 
 132. An article in the ABA Journal on the effects of domestic violence on the workplace 
quoted Julie Goldscheid, an expert in the area, as noting accurately, “People flinch at the 
idea of creating new protected classes, but this shouldn’t be controversial.” Margaret Gra-
ham Tebo, When Home Comes to Work, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2005, at 42, 45. In a forthcoming 
article, Professor Goldscheid argues that often termination of victims of domestic violence 
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ironic since the employer can benefit by being able to talk frankly 
about the situation, and victims are unlikely to share what is going 
on unless they know that they will not be fired for doing so. Framing 
the need for protection from termination as an antidiscrimination 
measure obscures a business’s understanding that ensuring victims 
feel safe disclosing their situation is in the business’s interest. Addi-
tionally, it fails to fully articulate the larger public interests at stake 
(as evidenced by the recognition by several courts that firing a victim 
because of the violence against her states a tort claim of wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy).133 
C.   Workplace Modifications/Individual Accommodations 
 Domestic violence is a recognized cause of workplace violence and 
disruption of the workplace. Taking safety precautions at the work-
place can reduce this risk. Responding to the need for workplace 
modifications, Illinois and New York City borrowed from the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act framework to enact legislation requiring 
employers to “reasonably accommodate” victims of domestic violence 
to permit them to perform their jobs.134 Illinois defines several illus-
trative accommodations within its statute: 
“Reasonable accommodation” may include an adjustment to a job 
structure, workplace facility, or work requirement, including a 
transfer, reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed 
telephone number or seating assignment, installation of a lock, or 
implementation of a safety procedure, in response to actual or 
threatened domestic or sexual violence.135 
                                                                                                                     
should be actionable under Title VII and also argues for adding victims of domestic vio-
lence as an explicitly protected class under antidiscrimination law. See Goldscheid, supra 
note 43, at 46-57. She notes, however, that the practical concerns regarding political oppo-
sition to enacting such legislation are considerable. See id. at 58. I agree that a strong case 
can be made for antidiscrimination law applying more broadly to termination of victims. 
However, as discussed in Part V, I think moving away from antidiscrimination models of-
fers significant conceptual and practical benefits.   
 133. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 134. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/30(B)(3) (2006); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-
107.1(3)(a) (2007). 
 135. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/30(B)(3) (2006). New York City’s law does not substan-
tively define reasonable accommodation within the text of the law, but a Committee Report 
issued when the city council was considering the provision describes it similarly:  
[The reasonable accommodations] provision would require employers to allow 
victims of domestic violence, sex offenses, or stalking to take leave from work 
to seek legal assistance, counseling, or assistance in developing a safety plan. 
Other reasonable accommodations could include but not be limited to re-
assigning seating so that a victim need not sit near an entrance, changing a 
victim’s telephone number, removing his or her name from the company’s 
phone directory, or adjusting starting and leaving times. In sum, this require-
ment could enable victims to remain viable and productive members of the 
workforce and to maintain a source of reliable and independent income.  
710  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:669 
 
As discussed above, the ADA (and comparable state laws) is a rela-
tively unusual employment law in its requirement that employers 
accommodate the specific individual needs of employees with dis-
abilities; accordingly, the ADA framework was an obvious model for 
laws requiring employers to make necessary changes to address the 
effects of domestic violence on individual employees and the work-
place.  
 However, again, this approach comes with certain limitations, 
both in terms of how it frames the issue and its likelihood of passing. 
As noted above, “domestic violence victim status” is not a personal 
characteristic, and likewise, workplace changes to reduce the threat 
of harassment or violence are not the equivalent of accommodating 
an individual’s disability.136 They are changes responding to violent 
or harassing conduct by a third party against the individual victim 
and her employer. Many such changes, by reducing the likelihood of 
such disruptions, benefit the employer at least as much as the em-
ployee. Framing the change as a “reasonable accommodation” for the 
individual employee obscures this reality.  
 The reasonable accommodation model also seems to carry with it 
certain political limitations. That is, just as leave laws modeled on 
the FMLA adopted the 50-employee threshold, both the New York 
City and the Illinois legislation requiring reasonable accommoda-
tions adopt the “undue hardship” employer defense built into the 
ADA.137 This means that individuals who work for relatively re-
source-poor employers may not have a right to necessary safety pre-
cautions. More generally, as with the expansion of antidiscrimination 
protections, modeling legislation on the ADA predisposes businesses 
to oppose it and makes it quite difficult to pass such legislation.  
 Interestingly, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
explicitly requires employers to provide a workplace “free from rec-
ognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or seri-
                                                                                                                     
NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & COMMITTEE 
ON GENERAL WELFARE, 3-4 (2003), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/59086.htm 
(regarding New York City Council Prop. Int. No. 107,  March 25, 2002). 
 136. It is important to note that many disability rights advocates and commentators 
argue that disability accommodations are not necessary because of an “intrinsic” lack of 
capability on the part of the person with the qualifying disability but rather necessary be-
cause of the mismatch between the social world and that person’s condition. In other 
words, for example, using a wheelchair only precludes access, and thus requires specific 
accommodations, in a world in which curb cuts, ramps, and elevators are not standard. 
 137. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-102(18) (2007) (defining “reasonable accommodation” 
as change that can be made without causing “undue hardship” to the covered entity’s busi-
ness). Illinois’ law defines undue hardship similarly. I am not suggesting that any accom-
modation, no matter how expensive, should be required, but rather that consideration of 
costs, as well as the related possibility of terminating a victim’s employment because of po-
tential safety threats, be integrated with other provisions to ensure in such situations that 
a victim maintains an independent income source. See infra Part V.A.  
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ous physical harm” to employees.138 OSHA covers all U.S. employers. 
The agency that administers OSHA has made it clear that it under-
stands the general duty clause as requiring employers to take steps 
to address potential workplace violence, including violence that spills 
over from domestic violence outside the workplace.139 Likewise, the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the 
branch of the CDC that oversees workplace violence, and the FBI 
also emphasize that businesses have a duty to address potential 
workplace violence stemming from domestic violence.140 All three en-
tities recommend many of the same kind of changes categorized as 
reasonable accommodations under the Illinois and New York City 
laws.141 Additionally, standard tort law also recognizes that employ-
ers may be held responsible for failing to address potential workplace 
violence.142 These other frameworks help make clear that safety-
increasing modifications are not individual employee benefits but 
rather changes that respond to a third-party threat and that benefit 
an entire workplace, as well as larger public interests. 
D.   Unemployment Insurance Provisions 
 Victims who either choose or are forced to leave a job because of 
domestic violence risk having no choice but to return to an abuser if 
they are not able to find alternative employment or another inde-
pendent income stream.143 In recent years, many states have 
amended their unemployment insurance statutes to meet this need.  
 The unemployment insurance system provides partial-wage re-
placement to individuals who lose a job through no fault of their 
own.144 The system is administered by the states, with support from 
                                                                                                                     
 138. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2008). 
 139. Letter from Roger A. Clarke, Director, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & 
Health Admin., to Mr. John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), available at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=20951 (recogniz-
ing that where the risk of harm from workplace violence is foreseeable, employer is bound 
to take steps to minimize those risks); see also, e.g., BRAVERMAN, supra note 28, at 96-97; 
PALUDI ET AL., supra note 28, at 81-82; (both discussing responsibility under OSHA to ad-
dress workplace risks stemming from violence, including domestic violence). 
 140. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: 
ISSUES IN RESPONSE 40-45 (2004) (suggesting employer should take steps such as 
“[a]dopting policies that will allow an abused worker time off for purposes such as going to 
court to seek a restraining order or appearing to testify at a criminal trial . . . . [r]eviewing 
the employee’s work space and modifying it, if necessary, to make sure that a possible as-
sailant cannot get there . . . [and] consistent[] with the employee’s privacy rights and 
wishes . . . tak[ing] measures to inform other employees . . . so they can block an abuser’s 
calls or make sure he is kept out of the workplace”). 
 141. See, e.g., PALUDI ET AL., supra note 28, at 82 (describing OSHA’s recommendations 
to address domestic violence).  
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.  
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.  
 144. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Human Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1971). 
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the federal government.145 Unemployment insurance explicitly serves 
interrelated public and private purposes. Insurance benefits are in-
tended to serve as a safety net for workers who lose their jobs while 
they look for new gainful employment, and more generally, to mini-
mize the effects of economic recessions by keeping consumer spend-
ing up even in economic downturns. The system is funded primarily 
by taxes on employers. Like other “insurance” systems, unemploy-
ment insurance premiums are experience-rated. Employers who are 
the subject of frequent claims (that is, employers who frequently lay 
off employees or otherwise have employees leave employment under 
qualifying circumstances) must pay a higher rate, just as drivers who 
frequently get in accidents must pay a higher premium to obtain 
automobile insurance. 
 In most states, the general rule is that individuals are ineligible 
for unemployment benefits if they leave work voluntarily without 
“good cause” or if they are discharged for “misconduct.” These condi-
tions stem from the general proposition that the benefits are in-
tended for individuals who are stopping work through no fault of 
their own. In the early days of the unemployment system, most 
states allowed workers to leave their jobs for valid personal rea-
sons.146 Many states, however, then narrowed these provisions, deny-
ing benefits to individuals who left work for non-work re-
lated causes.147  
 In recent years, this trend toward very limited access to benefits 
for personal reasons has been somewhat reversed, most often by 
amending state statutes to provide specific kinds of personal reasons 
that qualify as “good cause.”148 Domestic violence has been one of the 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301-3311 (2000); see also Gillian 
Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 340-58 
(2001) (providing a general overview of the unemployment insurance system). 
 146. NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, CHANGING WORKFORCE, CHANGING ECONOMY: 
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REFORMS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 18 (2004) (“In the 
1940s, 41 of 48 states allowed workers to leave their jobs for valid personal reasons; in 
2004, only 15 states do so.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Other areas of growth include providing benefits to workers who must leave a job 
due to health reasons, child care needs, or family hardship and to workers who must leave 
their jobs to move with a spouse or partner. See generally id. at 17-30; Lester, supra note 
90, at 3-4 (noting that as of 2001, twenty-one states had introduced bills to expand their 
unemployment insurance programs to provide wage replacement to parents following the 
birth or adoption of a child). There has also been a related effort to broaden state-funded 
temporary disability insurance to cover paid family leave, see id., most notably the enact-
ment in 2002 of paid family leave through California’s disability insurance program. Cali-
fornia Family Temporary Disability Insurance Program, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301 
(2007). A recently introduced federal bill would encourage states to permit workers to re-
cover benefits for a range of “compelling family reasons,” including domestic violence, a 
family member’s illness or disability, and following a spouse to a new job. See Unemploy-
ment Insurance Modernization Act, S. 1871, 110th Cong. (2007). 
2008]             DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE 713 
 
areas of most rapid growth.149 In 1996, Maine amended its unem-
ployment insurance law to make clear that victims who were fired 
because of domestic violence could receive benefits.150 In the decade 
since Maine changed its law, twenty-nine additional states and the 
District of Columbia have amended their unemployment insurance 
laws to address domestic violence.151 Additional states have intro-
duced legislation in the current or recent legislative sessions.152  
 The proliferation of state laws permitting domestic violence vic-
tims to obtain benefits responds to the concern that, without benefits, 
individuals who lose their jobs often have to remain with, or return 
to, an abusive partner or become homeless. As the New York State 
legislature explained, “We would not want to heighten a potential life 
threatening situation by forcing a victim to choose between their job 
and their life.”153 A victim of domestic violence who is forced to leave 
a job because of the violence—a criminal act against her—is (usually) 
leaving a job “through no fault of her own.” Providing benefits to her 
thus fits well within the traditional rationale of unemployment in-
surance benefits. But, of course, her separation from the job may also 
be through no “fault” of the employer, in that it is the perpetrator’s 
actions that may have precipitated the termination. Thus, the stan-
dard model of charging benefits to the employer unfairly penalizes 
                                                                                                                     
 149. For a good overview of the early history of legislation in this area written by sev-
eral of the key advocates, see Rebecca Smith, Richard W. McHugh, & Robin R. Runge, Un-
employment Insurance and Domestic Violence: Learning from Our Experiences, 1 SEATTLE 
J. SOC. JUST. 503 (2002); see also Tarr, supra note 43, at 402-10 (reviewing emerging legis-
lation and discussing specific actions for unemployment benefits brought by domestic vio-
lence victims). 
 150. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(23)(B)(3) (2007) (providing “misconduct” may 
not solely be founded on “[a]ctions taken by an employee that were necessary to protect the 
employee or an immediate family member from domestic violence if the employee made all 
reasonable efforts to preserve the employment”).  
 151. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-771 (2007); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1030, 1032, 1256 
(2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-108(4)(r) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(a)(2)(A) 
(2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(1) (2007); D.C. CODE §§ 51-131-136 (2007); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 405/601 (2006); IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1(1)(c)(8) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
706(a)(12) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1770-76 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 
1043(23)(B)(3) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, §§ 1, 14, 25, 30 (2007); MINN. STAT. 
§ 268.095(1)(8) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-2111 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-
628(1)(a) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a)(3) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-
5(j) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-7 (A) (2007); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(a) (2008); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 96-14(1)(b)(1f) (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, §§ 2-405(5), 3-106(G)(8) (2007); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 657.176(12) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-17.1 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-35-
125 & 41-35-130 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1 (2007); TEXAS LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 
207.045-.046 (2007); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1253 (2007) (Vermont’s law establishes a proce-
dure separate from its standard unemployment insurance benefits funds for domestic vio-
lence victims); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050, .20.100, .20.240,  .29.020 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 
108.04(7)(s) (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311 (2007). 
 152. For descriptions of pending and recent bills, see LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW 
GUIDE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (2008), available at 
http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/UI_feb_08.pdf?docID=1241. 
 153. N.Y. Bill Jacket, 1999 S.B. 827, Ch. 268.  
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the employer for this separation by raising the premiums it must pay 
in the future. Many state legislatures have responded to the reality 
that the responsible party, the abuser, is beyond the reach of the sys-
tem by simply providing that benefits will not be charged back to the 
employer’s account.154 In effect, this spreads the cost of providing the 
benefits to realize the public interest in protecting domestic violence 
victims across all employers.155  
E.   Workplace Restraining Orders 
 Employers obviously have a legitimate interest in taking steps to 
reduce the likelihood that a perpetrator of domestic violence will en-
gage in harassing or violent conduct against the victim or her co-
workers at the workplace. The challenge is to find mechanisms that 
may be used by an employer to achieve these objectives other than 
firing the victim. One approach is to make safety-related modifica-
tions at the workplace. Another is to permit employers to take direct 
legal action against the perpetrator.  
 About ten years ago, states began to pass laws, which I refer to as 
“workplace restraining orders,” permitting employers to apply for re-
straining orders (the equivalent of the personal protective order that 
victims of domestic violence may seek) against perpetrators of actual 
or threatened violence. These new laws provide civil injunctive relief 
against an individual who has harassed, threatened, assaulted, or 
stalked an employee on the employer’s worksite or while conducting 
the employer’s business. As of June 2008, ten states (Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, and Tennessee) have enacted workplace restraining 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-771(D) (2007). A recently passed law in Lou-
isiana adopts a slightly different approach by establishing a separate account, to be funded 
through legislative appropriations, from which domestic violence claims will be paid. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1770-76 (2007). It is theoretically possible that permitting employers 
to shift the costs associated with unemployment benefits onto a common fund  or separate 
account could have the unintended effect of making it easier to fire victims of domestic vio-
lence without “cause” than other employees because employers would not bear the costs 
associated with such a termination. Further study should be done to determine the extent 
of such potential risk. More to the point, as discussed in Part V, pairing unemployment in-
surance reforms with other legislative reforms that make it easier for victims to maintain 
employment should reduce this risk.   
 155. In other contexts, advocates have also recognized the potential of unemployment 
or temporary disability insurance to serve as a mechanism to spread the costs of partial or 
full wage replacement for individuals who temporarily cannot work across employers, em-
ployees, or both and have increasingly focused on these systems as a fruitful possibility for 
achieving paid benefits for family care-giving needs. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 90. Not co-
incidentally, the family hardship and care-giving exceptions, as well as the domestic vio-
lence exceptions, primarily benefit women and reflect the reality that the traditional eligi-
bility requirements were designed in large part around norms of a male workforce, which 
results in a significant gender gap in who receives unemployment insurance. See NAT’L 
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 146. 
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order laws.156 These laws are generally strongly supported by the 
business lobby, and many, sensitive to the possibility that tort stan-
dards suggest that employers should ignore potential workplace vio-
lence, explicitly provide that an employer acting in good faith will be 
immune from civil liability for seeking or failing to seek an injunc-
tion.157 It is also important to note that even in jurisdictions that 
have not created workplace restraining orders, employers may take 
actions, such as filing a police report or civil action for trespass or 
harassment, against a perpetrator who interferes with the business.  
 Workplace restraining orders can be helpful in that they make 
clear that the problem is not the victim but, rather, the abuser who is 
harassing the victim. However, they can pose real risks. The order in 
such a case is issued in the name of the business, and the laws per-
mit the business to decide whether to seek such an order. But the 
perpetrator of violence will typically understand the order as coming 
at the individual victim’s behest and may take his anger out on the 
victim outside the workplace or may respond to such an order by ac-
tually attacking the workplace.158 Thus, a business taking steps to 
address domestic violence by seeking a protective order without con-
sulting the individual victim may actually increase the danger to the 
victim and, potentially, to her coworkers. Such provisions should in-
clude requirements that the victim be alerted and protections from 
                                                                                                                     
 156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115 (2008); CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 527.8 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(4)(B) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1-7 (2007); IND. CODE § 34-26-6 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.200-.360 (2007); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 95-261 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-14-101-
109 (2007).  
 157. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.200 to .360 (2007); see also supra notes 39-41 and 
accompanying text (discussing potential tort liability). 
 158. Obtaining a protective order does not guarantee that violence will end. In fact, it 
is common for perpetrators of domestic violence to violate protective orders. See, e.g., 
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 6, at 53 (finding approximately one half of protective or-
ders obtained by women against intimate partners who had physically abused them, and 
approximately two-thirds of orders obtained against intimate partners who have stalked or 
raped them, are violated). Because of this concern, domestic violence advocates generally 
maintain that a victim should not be required to seek a protective order; rather, she should 
make a reasoned decision after assessing the situation and potential risks that may be 
posed by issuance of an order. The factors in the business situation are a little different, 
but it would be foolhardy for a business to take such a step without at least consulting the 
victim and learning how she expects the abuser would respond. Nina Tarr similarly ob-
serves that issuance of a workplace restraining order may heighten the risk of violence 
against a victim. See Tarr, supra note 43, at 374. Professor Tarr sees less benefit that I do 
to offering employers the possibility of taking direct legal action against the perpetrator 
and characterizes such laws as a “paternalistic” response to domestic violence that takes 
too much autonomy away from the victim. See id. Although I am generally sympathetic to 
her concerns regarding victim autonomy, I believe workplace restraining orders, particu-
larly when linked to other opportunities for a victim to take steps she deems appropriate in 
addressing the violence, see infra Part V.A, may play a valuable role in balancing of the 
employer’s and employee’s interests and advancing their shared interest in promoting 
workplace safety and productivity.  
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her being fired based on her situation, as discussed in greater detail 
in Part V.  
F.   Government Action Encouraging Effective Workplace Policies 
 In addition to the specific protections described above for employ-
ees and for businesses, legislation may also address the issue by 
helping businesses understand that it is both in their interest to take 
steps to address domestic violence and, equally important, that it is 
doable. Toward this end, the 2005 reauthorization of VAWA author-
ized the appropriation of funds to create a national clearinghouse of 
best practices by employers in addressing domestic violence.159 Fund-
ing to create the center was appropriated in the federal fiscal year 
2008 budget.160  Additionally, seventeen states have required state 
employers to adopt policies addressing domestic violence and/or have 
developed model policies for private businesses.161 Puerto Rico went 
even further, specifically requiring all businesses to adopt a “proto-
col” addressing domestic violence.162  
 Model policies typically encourage employment-related supports 
for victims (e.g., time off and protection from firing); emphasize the 
need for safety modifications in the workplace; and prohibit perpe-
trators from engaging in domestic violence while at work or using 
company property.163 Many also encourage businesses to help em-
ployees access domestic violence supports through a company spon-
sored Employee Assistance Plan and/or through community re-
sources. Not surprisingly, these provisions are similar to those iden-
tified by the CDC as strategies adopted by private employers that 
have taken a lead on the issue.164 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See Violence Against Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L.No. 109-162, § 701 (2005).  
 160. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Public L. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).  
 161. For descriptions of the various approaches taken by states and links, where avail-
able, to the policies, see LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE WORKPLACE POLICIES (2007), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/ 
DocServer/policies.pdf?docID=502. 
 162. 2006 P. R. Laws 217, available at http://puertoricolaw.typepad.com/doing_business_in_puerto_/files/ 
protocol_domestic_violence_in_the_workplace.pdf. The law includes a cryptic requirement that such 
protocol must include a “public policy statement, a legal and applicability basis, personnel 
liability and uniform procedures and measures to follow in the management of cases.” 
Given its opaqueness, it is unclear how effective this legislation will be; a more promising 
strategy might specify or recommend measures that should be included in such policies. 
See Dougan & Wells, supra note 53 (discussing elements of an effective policy).  
 163. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
WORKPLACE POLICIES, supra note 161.  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.  
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G.   Common Challenges 
 After discussing the emerging legislation in such detail, it is help-
ful to step back and return to the two common challenges identified 
at the beginning of this Part.  
 The first challenge, implicit in all of the various forms of legisla-
tion, is whether and how employment laws, which typically regulate 
the relationship between an employer and an employee, can be used 
to address workplace effects of domestic violence caused by a third 
party perpetrator. As discussed above, Title VII and the ADA were 
developed to address what really are individual characteristics of 
employees. They do not translate well to the domestic violence situa-
tion because it is the perpetrator’s actions, rather than the victim’s 
own characteristics, that require the employer to take preventative 
action or, often, that precipitate a decision to fire a victim. Workplace 
restraining order provisions, by contrast, can be effective because 
they authorize the employer to take actions directly against the per-
petrator, but they must be applied with sensitivity to protect the re-
lated, but potentially separate, interests of the individual victim.  
 Second, and relatedly, because the perpetrator is the cause of 
workplace disruptions, as well as of a victim’s absences or need to 
leave a job because of violence, legislatures must grapple with how to 
apportion costs associated with any employment-related accommoda-
tions. The various statutes discussed take different approaches. The 
ADA-modeled accommodation mandates impose the costs on employ-
ers, but only if they do not impose an “undue hardship.” OSHA regu-
lations, by contrast, require all employers to take reasonable precau-
tions against threatened violence. The unemployment provisions 
consciously spread costs across employers. Most strikingly, the do-
mestic violence leave laws reach dramatically different answers de-
pending, it seems, on whether the law is modeled on the FMLA, in 
which case it will only apply to large employers with at least fifty 
employees, or on crime victim job protection laws, in which case it 
will apply to all employers.  
 This pattern holds significance for considering employment ac-
commodation mandates more generally. It suggests that focusing on 
larger “public” interests at stake in the need for potential accommo-
dations, such as a common desire for effective criminal prosecution or 
to address general public health or safety needs, may significantly 
increase the willingness of legislatures to impose costs on employers. 
In other words, if changes are framed as individual benefits for a 
single employee (here the victim), it seems appropriate to balance 
such costs against the employer’s resources and excuse employers 
that are deemed too small or resource-poor. But if the changes are 
framed instead as furthering common objectives (that of the public at 
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large, the employer and coworkers, as well as the individual em-
ployee) legislatures seem much more comfortable either imposing 
costs on all employers or creatively considering ways to spread costs. 
V.   DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE AND TARGETED APPROACH 
 The sheer volume of new legislation discussed in Part IV demon-
strates a significant interest in addressing the workplace effects of 
domestic violence. Nevertheless, the current patchwork of protections 
is inadequate. In this Part, I propose reframing the need for domestic 
violence employment laws as furthering our public strategy of com-
bating domestic violence, rather than as protections or benefits for 
individual victims or individual employers. While perhaps subtle, the 
shift in focus is more likely to yield a successful, comprehensive, and 
targeted strategy for tackling the issue. Such a strategy could be 
adopted by individual states or by Congress.165   
 My proposal rests on an understanding, as described in Parts II 
and III, that the issue involves multiple interested parties with inter-
locking objectives. Employees who are victims want to be able to take 
reasonable steps to address the violence without losing their jobs or, 
if a separation from work is necessary, an adequate independent in-
come source. Employers and coworkers of the victim, as well as the 
victim herself, want to keep their workplaces safe and productive. 
The public at large has an interest in reducing incidents of domestic 
violence, from public health and criminal justice perspectives and a 
more general commitment to ensuring individuals can live free from 
violence. And, although not the focus of analysis in this Article, per-
petrators of domestic violence have an interest in fair workplace pro-
cedures that properly assess when and whether employers may take 
action in response to violence they commit.166 An effective strategy 
will need to serve all of these interrelated needs.167 Additionally, as 
                                                                                                                     
 165. As discussed in Part IV, states have been far ahead of the federal government in 
tackling workplace-related effects of domestic violence. Given that the legal regulation of 
domestic violence in family law and criminal law is also primarily a matter of state law, it 
may not be surprising that the employment laws are also primarily state laws. Comparable 
legislation, however, has been introduced in the current and recent Congresses, see supra 
note 4, and there obviously would be benefits to establishing a federal floor of basic provi-
sions that states could choose to go beyond. Congress probably has authority to enact such 
legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See cases cited supra note 4.  
 166. Employers who take actions against alleged perpetrators of domestic violence may 
face liability under a variety of theories, especially if the accusations turn out to be un-
founded. See generally FREDERICA LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 10:26-10:30 (1996 & Supp. 2005) (discussing potential defamation, wrongful 
discharge, invasion of privacy, and ADA claims). Additionally, even those concerned pri-
marily with “victims’ ” rights need to be concerned about how alleged perpetrators are 
treated since it is not uncommon for persons, ultimately determined to be victims, to them-
selves be accused of battering a partner. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 67-68.  
 167. There is potentially a cost to such reframing as well. Domestic violence grows out 
of larger issues of gender subordination, and, Julie Goldscheid argues, there is an inde-
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the analysis of emerging legislation in Part IV made clear, moving 
away from the individual-rights framework of traditional employ-
ment law models makes it more likely that legislation will appropri-
ately address the role of the perpetrator and, relatedly, the possibil-
ity of spreading costs associated with changes beyond the individual 
employer and employee.  
 The remainder of this Part describes four particular suggestions 
that flow from consciously reframing the issue as a public problem 
requiring systemic solutions. First, I argue that various legislative 
initiatives can reinforce each other, yielding benefits greater than the 
sum of the parts. Second, I suggest that we need to consciously de-
velop legislative models that encourage employers and employees to 
work together. Third, reframing the issue as implicating larger pub-
lic health and safety issues also underscores the need to better un-
derstand the costs and benefits involved. Accordingly, future reforms 
should include a commitment to measuring effectiveness of new leg-
islation, as well as other voluntary business initiatives to address the 
problem. Fourth, we should consider the possibility of using public 
expenditures to cover costs that are beyond those that can reasonably 
be borne by individual employers or employees.     
A.   Pair Legislative Strategies  
 Up until now, most of the legislation discussed in Part IV (e.g., 
time off for victims, discrimination protections, and unemployment 
insurance provisions) has been sought by victims and their advocates 
and opposed by employers and their advocates. Workplace restrain-
ing orders, on the other hand, have been sought by employers and 
greeted with skepticism, if not outright opposition, by victims and 
their advocates. By approaching the situation from the individual 
“business” perspective or “victim” perspective, many advocates and 
legislatures have failed to recognize the benefits of addressing the is-
                                                                                                                     
pendent value in framing the need to address the workplace effects of domestic violence as 
a means of addressing sex discrimination, separate from cost reduction and safety concerns 
that may be more politically palatable. See Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 20-21. Feminist 
scholars have made this point more generally as domestic violence services have been in-
creasingly framed as public health or public safety issues rather than a women’s rights is-
sue. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 23-28. Such commentators suggest that domes-
tic violence cannot be “solved” or “treated” without addressing the underlying issues of 
women’s equality that it expresses. See id. I share the concerns raised by such commenta-
tors. However, as explained more fully in the text, I believe that at least in the employ-
ment context, the conceptual and practical benefits offered by moving away from an indi-
vidual rights and gender-specific focus are significant and, on balance, worth the cost. In-
deed, as briefly noted in the Conclusion, the successful transformation of domestic violence 
from a “private” concern with which employers, and society, have no responsibility to a 
public matter may offer lessons for reframing other so-called “private” matters, such as 
need to accommodate family care-giving responsibilities, for which existing employment 
law has been largely inadequate. 
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sue more comprehensively. In fact, compartmentalizing the problem 
in this fashion may actually make it less likely that effective reforms 
are adopted at all. Pairing certain legislative initiatives together can 
help remove potential objections and more appropriately balance 
employers’ and victims’ interrelated interests, as well as the public’s 
interests, making legislation both more likely to pass and more likely 
to be effective once passed. 
 
Example 1: Integrate victim employment protections 
with workplace restraining orders 
Employers typically oppose proposed legislation that protects em-
ployees from being fired based on their status as victims. In part, 
this opposition is motivated by a concern that creating a new pro-
tected class will increase the number of unjustified employment 
discrimination complaints against employers. But employers’ ob-
jections also tend to stem from the belief that, if they cannot fire 
the victim of violence, they are increasing the likelihood that vio-
lence will occur at the workplace. Thus, passing a workplace re-
straining order law, which gives employers their own independent 
authority to take legal action against the perpetrator, helps neu-
tralize employers’ concern regarding provisions that protect vic-
tims from being fired. The reverse is also true. Employers seek 
workplace restraining order legislation so that they can respond to 
potential threats in the workplace. However, without employment 
protections, victims are unlikely to disclose their situations to their 
employers, and employers are thus only likely to learn about 
threats to the workplace after they have already materialized. 
Thus, to truly address the problem of workplace violence effec-
tively, both provisions may well be necessary. 
 
Example 2: Integrate unemployment insurance provi-
sions with domestic violence leave provisions 
Victims, no matter what the size of their employers, often need 
time off from the workplace and the confidence that there will be a 
job or another source of income in the future. Making both time 
and income available helps ensure that those who are interested in 
ending an abusive relationship will be able to do so. The crime vic-
tim job protection laws, which apply to all employers, suggest that 
even small employers can provide some number of days off. But it 
is also true that larger employers can more readily handle ex-
tended absences than smaller employers. Consciously integrating 
unemployment provisions with domestic violence leave statutes 
can address this reality without leaving victims who work for 
small employers without recourse. For example, under a tiered 
leave program, all employees could receive at least some job-
protected leave; employees that work for larger employers could 
receive more generous leave while unemployment benefits could be 
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available for those who work for smaller employers until they find 
new employment. 
 
Example 3: Integrate analysis of the risk of workplace 
violence with consideration of both workplace accom-
modations and availability of unemployment insur-
ance benefits 
As noted above, there are many relatively inexpensive steps an 
employer, in consultation with a victim of domestic violence, may 
take to reduce the risk that domestic violence will spill over into 
physical violence at the workplace. Nonetheless, in certain in-
stances, it might be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to safe-
guard a workplace while the victim continues to work there. In 
such cases, the best approach might be for her to separate from the 
employment but receive access to unemployment insurance bene-
fits or some other independent income stream. A comprehensive 
legislative strategy would integrate analysis of the risk posed to 
the workplace, the cost of safety precautions at her workplace, and 
the victim’s need for independent income if separated from the 
workplace.168  
 Putting these various examples together demonstrates how a 
comprehensive strategy that is sensitive to these interrelated objec-
tives can be greater than the sum of its parts and more appropriately 
balance the various interests. Victims would be assured that they 
would not be fired simply for disclosing what was occurring to them. 
Victims, no matter what the size of their employer, would have ac-
cess to a reasonable amount of time off to take steps to address the 
violence. Individuals who work for larger employers would have 
greater amount of time; those that worked for smaller employers 
might lose their job if they needed too much time but would have ac-
cess to a separate form of income. Employers would be empowered, 
after consulting with the victim, to take direct legal action against a 
perpetrator of threatened violence. They would also be required to 
take reasonable safety precautions to secure the workplace. If, after 
                                                                                                                     
 168. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 20-23, an independent source 
of income is one of the most important factors in whether a victim of domestic violence will 
be able to end an abusive relationship. Continued employment is obviously one important 
source of such income, and as noted above, the community of a workplace (as well as the 
self confidence that can come from having a job) may provide additional intangible benefits 
to victims. Nonetheless, income could also come from a government-sponsored income pro-
gram, such as unemployment insurance benefits, disability benefits, or welfare benefits. 
Because of moral hazard concerns, none of these benefit programs replace a salary com-
pletely. Rather, they typically provide half or less of salary. Thus, victims (and their advo-
cates) would obviously generally prefer continuation of paid employment if possible. How-
ever, for purposes of promoting an interest in reducing violence, the income simply must be 
sufficient to allow a victim who wishes to separate from an abuser to do so, recover from 
the violence, and find new work. 
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good faith efforts, it is clear that it will be prohibitively expensive to 
safeguard the workplace, a victim could be lawfully terminated pro-
vided that she then had access to unemployment insurance benefits 
or another independent stream of income.  
 Such an integrated approach reasonably satisfies the interests of 
both employers and employees, as well as the public commitment to 
effectively addressing domestic violence. In fact, although providing 
access to unemployment insurance benefits and empowering employ-
ers to seek workplace restraining orders goes beyond what an indi-
vidual business can do on its own, the other provisions I’ve outlined 
are quite similar to the strategies employed by businesses that have 
voluntarily developed domestic violence policies.169 Linking them to-
gether is most likely to encourage a frank discussion of the situation 
and best protect the safety of the individual victim, her coworkers, 
and her employer; by contrast, enacting individual components with-
out the others may not offer sufficient protection to either the em-
ployer’s or employee’s interests to actually achieve the common objec-
tives.  
 A handful of states have passed most of the elements discussed 
above, perhaps implicitly recognizing the potential value of a com-
prehensive approach. North Carolina, for example, provides reason-
able time off to employees, no matter how small their employers, to 
seek judicial relief.170 It provides businesses with the authority to 
seek injunctive relief against workplace violence, but specifies that 
they must consult with the employee who is the target to assess po-
tential safety risks.171 The legislature required the Governor’s Com-
mission on Domestic Violence to develop model policies, track violent 
incidents in state workplaces, and work with state agencies to im-
plement effective workplace violence prevention programs.172 Its at-
torney general’s office has hosted two major workplace summits, 
bringing together businesses that have taken a leadership role in ad-
dressing the issue to share best practices.173 And victims who need to 
leave a job because of the violence can access unemployment insur-
ance benefits.174 It is not an accident that North Carolina has all of 
these laws. The North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
 170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5.5 (2007). 
 171. Id. § 95-261. 
 172. Id. § 143B-394.16(a)(3). 
 173. N.C. Dep’t of Justice, Domestic Violence in the Workplace Summit: Don’t Let Do-
mestic Violence Hurt Your Business, http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamerClient?directory=WhatsNew/ 
&file=WorkplaceSummitInvite.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008) (advertisement for summit held in 
Asheville, N.C. on Nov. 9, 2006); N.C. Dep’t of Admin., Domestic Violence in the Workplace 
Summit, Oct. 30, 2003 (Chapel Hill, N.C.), http://www.doa.state.nc.us/dvio/ (postevent Web 
site for Summit held Oct. 30, 2003) (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1f). 
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has focused on economic security as essential for victims and worked 
over several years to help educate lawmakers about the changes that 
are necessary to make that possible and local businesses on the bene-
fits of proactively addressing domestic violence.175  
B.   Encourage Collaboration Between Employers and Employees 
 In addition to the benefits that are possible by passing strategi-
cally-paired packages of the kinds of laws already being enacted in 
the various states, review of the legislation suggests new models 
should be developed to encourage the collaborative problem solving 
between employer and victims that businesses who have successfully 
implemented domestic violence policies say works best.176 In this re-
spect, it is particularly important to consider the problem of victims 
being fired because of a fear of workplace violence. As described in 
Part IV, the individual employment rights framework adapted from 
Title VII and the ADA has both conceptual and practical limitations. 
On the former point, the need for workplace protections is largely 
caused by third-party actions rather than a personal characteristic of 
the victim, so there are substantive limitations in using traditional 
employment discrimination models to tackle the problem.177 On the 
latter point, modeling domestic violence laws on either Title VII or 
the ADA tends to raise red flags with employers, obscuring the ex-
tent to which employers and victims share an interest in effectively 
addressing the situation.178  
 In part, the situation could perhaps be remedied by crafting pro-
tections in language that is more tailored to the situation. For exam-
ple, rather than prohibiting discrimination against victims of domes-
tic violence, an alternative approach could provide that “victims may 
not be fired or refused employment because they obtain a protective 
order or take other steps to secure their safety; because they ask for 
modifications at work to reduce the likelihood of harassing or violent 
conduct occurring at the workplace; or because the workplace is dis-
rupted by harassing conduct by the perpetrator of violence against 
them.”179  
                                                                                                                     
 175. Telephone interview with Beth Froehling, Interim Executive Dir. & Pub. Policy 
Dir., N.C. Coal. Against Domestic Violence (July 2006). Despite its significant advances, 
North Carolina’s protections also remain something of a patchwork, most notably in that 
the legislative structure fails to protect individuals of domestic violence from being fired 
simply because of the violence against them. See supra notes 44 & 124 (discussing Imes v. 
City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. App. 2004)).  
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
 177. See infra Part IV.B and IV.C. 
 178. See id. 
 179. As noted above, Rhode Island and Connecticut have each adopted provisions, as 
part of their criminal code, that prohibit terminating victims because they have obtained a 
protective order. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 12-28-10 (2007). 
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 Reframing the language in this way has several benefits. Sub-
stantively, it better describes why victims typically need employment 
protections and speaks directly to the problems posed by harassment 
at the workplace. It could better help employers understand the ex-
tent to which it may be in their own interest to offer such protections 
to victims and thus might be more likely to be enactable. As de-
scribed above, such language could be integrated with a requirement 
that employers take reasonable protective measures against threat-
ened workplace violence and, potentially, an exception permitting 
separation (with access to unemployment benefits or other independ-
ent income source for the victim) in the relatively rare cases where 
there is a specific particularized threat to the workplace that cannot 
be addressed effectively through such protective measures.180 
 Building in part on Susan Sturm’s insights regarding effective 
strategies to counter structural bias and harassment,181 I suggest 
that beyond simply prohibiting negative actions against employees, 
legal standards should encourage collective problemsolving, such as 
that described by employers who have voluntarily developed effective 
approaches.182 Thus, employers should be required to discuss with 
employees who voluntarily disclose that they are victims of violence 
what changes could be made at work to help keep the workplace safe 
and productive. As Julie Goldscheid points out, requiring such a dia-
                                                                                                                     
The language I propose above would go further to explicitly address the problem of a ter-
mination due to harassing conduct by the perpetrator of the violence. It would, however, 
arguably leave a gap in coverage. Individuals who were fired or refused employment purely 
based on their status as victims might not be covered; in practice, however, it is far more 
common for victims to face negative employment actions based on the specific reasons out-
lined in the proposed statutory language than on the basis of their “status” alone. 
 180. As noted above, such changes may be framed as “reasonable accommodations” for 
the victim or as general workplace safety requirements. See supra Part IV.C. I would tend 
to expand on the workplace safety framework rather than the ADA framework because I 
believe this more appropriately recognizes that the modifications are for the benefit of the 
employer generally, not just the individual employee, and are a result of the perpetrators’ 
actions. However, the substance of the proposal is similar to that made by other commen-
tators who suggest an ADA model should be used. See Porter, supra note 39, at 325-30; 
Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 54-56. Both also suggest that where, even after reasonable 
accommodations, the threat posed is too great, the victim may be lawfully terminated. See 
Porter, supra note 39, at 325-30; Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 54-56. As noted in the text, 
the comprehensive approach I am suggesting goes one step further by advocating that any 
provisions allowing terminations based on such risk assessment be integrated with 
mechanisms to ensure that the victim maintains an adequate independent income source 
from unemployment insurance benefits or some other funding source. 
 181. Susan Sturm’s insights regarding effective strategies to counter structural bias 
and harassment may be an instructive example of such an approach. She analyzes three 
companies that have implemented effective approaches to combating barriers to women’s 
advancement and concludes that legal regimes help set the normative goals for an em-
ployment strategy and that liability avoidance spurred change, but “economic and ethical 
motivations” figured prominently as well. See Sturm, supra note 78, at 489-520. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. Again, other commentators have sug-
gested a similar requirement modeled on the “interactive process” required by the ADA. 
See Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 51-54; Porter, supra note 39, at 325-30. 
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logue could combat implicit bias that may lead employers to blame 
the victim or exaggerate the potential risk posed to the workplace.183 
Toward that end, and to counter the disincentives that tort law could 
otherwise provide to taking proactive steps,184 it might be appropriate 
to craft affirmative defenses (or tailored liability limitations) for 
companies that implement effective policies to address domestic vio-
lence against any claims that arise from workplace violence that, de-
spite such precautionary acts, occurs.185 Of course, as Sturm also 
points out, it would also be essential that courts considering such de-
fenses actually assess the effectiveness of such strategies.186 Such a 
process-focused approach could better facilitate the kind of open ex-
change that is necessary to address the situation.  
C.   Assess Effectiveness 
 The data reviewed in Part II suggested that workplace interven-
tions can play a central role in reducing domestic violence, benefiting 
victims and employers, as well as the general public. However, de-
spite the rapid passage of laws in numerous states, there has been 
very little effort to assess whether these laws are in fact achieving 
their objectives. What little we know comes from informal assess-
ments of efficacy rather than structured research. For example, the 
Maine Commissioner of Labor, Laura Fortman, recently testified be-
fore a U.S. Senate subcommittee about her state’s experience with a 
domestic violence leave law. Most interestingly, she reported that the 
Maine Chamber of Commerce had originally opposed the leave law, 
but after seeing it in action for a few years, announced that its mem-
bers had heard “no complaints” and that accordingly it would support 
an expansion of the law to cover family members.187 She also reported 
a conversation at a conference of human resources officials in her 
state; the conference attendees were generally supportive of Maine’s 
domestic violence workplace legislation but said the state needed to 
do more to increase awareness of the laws.188 While certainly promis-
ing, the testimony also left open the possibility that part of the rea-
son businesses had hardly felt its effects was that few victims were 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 51-54. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.  
 185. Cf. Sturm, supra note 78 (discussing significance of affirmative defenses in the 
sexual harassment context).  
 186. Id. at 538-42. 
 187. “Too Much, Too Long? Domestic Violence in the Workplace” Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Employment & Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, La-
bor & Pensions, 110th Cong. (Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Laura A. Fortman, Comm’r, 
Maine Department of Labor) (quoting testimony of Peter Gore, Senior Governmental Af-
fairs Specialist, Maine Chamber of Commerce), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_04_17/Fortman%20.pdf. 
 188. Id. 
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aware of its protections. Anecdotal reports from advocates in other 
states report similar challenges in raising awareness of new protec-
tions.189 
 As noted above, the CDC approaches domestic violence as a public 
health matter and toward this end studies the scope of the problem 
as well as efficacy of various strategies on changing behavior. Much 
of the research documenting the effects of domestic violence on the 
workplace discussed in Part II was funded by the CDC. Assessing the 
success of various legislative strategies, as well as the effectiveness 
of individual businesses’ policies, can help inform future develop-
ment.190 As a first step, the CDC or other public entities (along with 
victim advocates and intermediary organizations that work with the 
corporate world) should focus on simply raising awareness of new 
laws and helping both victims and employers understand their rights 
and responsibilities. Sensitive evaluation methods could then help 
assess the pros and cons of various approaches and determine to 
what extent they help achieve the intertwined objectives of improv-
ing the safety and productivity of both victims and workplaces. Any 
such studies should be designed not only to measure economic bene-
fits but also increases in safety and wellbeing that may be less eas-
ily quantified.  
D.   Consider Role for Public Expenditures 
 The public interest in assisting victims of domestic violence does 
not vary based on the size of their employers. For the reasons dis-
cussed in Part II, addressing the workplace effects of domestic vio-
lence can be a primary strategy in reducing domestic violence. But, 
as discussed above, domestic violence laws modeled on the FMLA 
and the ADA (like the FMLA and the ADA themselves) simply de-
termine that certain costs are too great for at least some employers 
to bear and leave no recourse for individuals who happen to work for 
such smaller or resource-poor employers. Recognizing the larger pub-
lic interests at stake, legislatures should consider public funding, or 
other cost-spreading mechanisms, to supplement costs that they 
deem unreasonable for either individual employers or individual em-
ployees to bear as a result of a perpetrator of domestic violence’s 
criminal actions. Various possibilities could be used to compensate 
                                                                                                                     
 189. E-mails from Wendy Pollock, Senior Staff Attorney, Sargent Shriver Ctr. on Pov-
erty & the Law, to author (on file with author) (reporting challenges in publicizing Illinois’ 
law providing time off and protection from termination); e-mails from Anya Lochner, Legal 
Aid Soc’y, Employment Law Ctr. to author (on file with author) (reporting challenges in 
publicizing California’s domestic violence leave law). 
 190. Cf. Fisher & Peek-Asa, supra note 28, at 113-14 (noting variation among recom-
mendations regarding domestic violence workplace strategies and advocating structured 
research to determine effectiveness).  
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the employer (e.g., grants or tax credits) or the individual (e.g., un-
employment insurance benefits, grants, crime victim compensation, 
or welfare benefits).191  
 Public funding can also play a role in some of the other strategies 
addressed above: public education efforts to raise awareness of new 
laws; support for businesses to implement effective domestic violence 
policies, including simply helping equip them to make referrals to 
community domestic violence resources, and research to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various responses. The key is that understanding 
employment-focused interventions as part of a larger strategy of 
combating domestic violence can justify public expenditures. In other 
words, just as we fund shelters, criminal prosecutions, or civil legal 
services, we should consider funding some workplace-related needs.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Until the nineteenth century, domestic violence was sanctioned as 
an appropriate means for the male head of the household to control 
his wife. Even long after the demise of legal authorization for the 
practice, certain stereotypical gender norms play a role in its per-
petuation. The second-wave feminists who, beginning in the 1970s, 
spearheaded the modern movement to end domestic violence, defined 
battering within a larger framework of gender subordination; shel-
ters were designed not simply to provide safe homes to women who 
had been victims of violence but also to permit women to self-govern, 
creating a separate space defined outside traditional gender roles.192 
Domestic violence continues to be a significant barrier to women’s 
full participation in society, including, as detailed in this Article, in 
the workplace. 
 Accordingly, one framework for legislation combating the effects of 
domestic violence on the workplace is a civil rights frame and the in-
dividual rights model of employment law that fits within it. As dis-
cussed above, there are state statutes that borrow from Title VII, as 
well as the Americans with Disability Act and the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act, to protect domestic violence victims. However, these 
may be less effective than new laws built on criminal law, workplace 
safety, or unemployment insurance models. In part, the limitations 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Victims’ compensation is a publicly administered program that is funded by fines 
levied on criminal offenders. See Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10603 
(2000); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OVC FACT SHEET, VICTIMS 
OF CRIME ACT CRIME VICTIMS’ FUND (2005), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/vocacvf/fs000310.pdf. VOCA funds are 
already used to help compensate victims for missed work. Assessing the appropriateness of 
these various approaches (both in terms of practicality and in terms of economic efficiency) 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 192. SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 20-23. 
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in the traditional civil rights approach are due to the fact that it is 
(at least often) the perpetrator, not the victim, that causes the need 
for workplace interventions. But in part, these limitations are also 
due to a deep-seated reluctance to impose costs on employers for ac-
commodating what are perceived to be “individual” or “private” 
needs. By contrast, new laws drawing from criminal justice, work-
place safety, and unemployment insurance approaches tend to im-
pose costs more generally or spread costs across employers. 
 It is difficult to know exactly why this division has occurred, but I 
believe it may be in part because domestic violence advocates have so 
successfully redefined what was once perceived as “merely” a private 
issue as, instead, a public crisis requiring systemic solutions. Under-
standing the public nature of the problem, legislatures are comfort-
able asking employers to help address the situation—and, indeed, a 
growing number of employers embrace the constructive role that 
they can play. And thus, although somewhat ironic, the steadfast re-
fusal of the legal system to address domestic violence which led to 
the determined efforts to reconceptualize this “private” family matter 
as a “public” responsibility may offer the promise of helping us re-
think how we deal with other issues that fall on the “fault line be-
tween work and family”193 for which traditional employment law has 




                                                                                                                     
 193. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).  
